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ONE SHILLING.

THE ART
OF
PUBLIC SPEAKING

AN
EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF ORATORY

BY
SAMUEL NEIL

AUTHOR OF "CULTURE AND SELF-EDUCATION," "THE YOUNG DEBATER,"
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AN
Exposition of the Principles of Oratory

By SAMUEL NEIL

AUTHOR OF "CULTURE AND SELF-CULTURE," "THE YOUNG DEBATER,"
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PREFACE.

ELOQUENCE is one not only of the Fine but of the Useful Arts. It implies both culture and enjoyment; and any fair exposition of its nature necessitates the statement not merely of Precepts for practice, but also the furnishing of Principles for guidance in criticism.

The acquisition of the art of arranging and expressing ideas with correctness and facility, and of attaining a habit of clear and consecutive thinking, combined with a fluent and easy utterance of its results, must increase in proportion as the duties of civil and social life widen in their range, and demand a greater amount of popular attention and regard. The tendencies of modern legislation are such as to make an acquaintance, not only with the means of promoting opinions by public advocacy, but the power of judging of the accuracy of the views advanced, and of the arguments employed in the conducting of public business, a more and more urgent need of our times. Men to be worthy of their condition must prepare for the proper performance of its duties.

Public speaking is a power more or less required by all,—a power that is likely to be more and more required by many,—and it is an agency on the merits of which all require to be able to form a judgment. Men not only influence, but are influenced by it. Newspapers now make each individual a virtual auditor of all great orators, and every distinguished public man. Hence an acquaintance with the Principles on which the successful expression of Thought in public depends must be useful in guiding our criticism, even when it is not required to affect our own practice.

This Work is intended as an aid to a correct knowledge of the Art of Public Speaking, either in the culture of personal power, or in the exercise of individual judgment on the Oratory of our time, that so the general interest may be advanced by the prompting of true endeavour and the educing of just criticism.

S. N.

MOFFAT, *November*, 1867.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SPEAKING—	
ANCIENT AND MODERN ELOQUENCE COMPARED AND	
CONTRASTED	5

CHAPTER II.

PARLIAMENTARY ELOQUENCE; ITS AIM, PLACE, METHOD,	
AND DIVISIONS	15

CHAPTER III.


THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELOQUENCE	
DEFINED AND EXPLAINED	29

CHAPTER IV.

FORENSIC ELOQUENCE	51
------------------------------	----

CHAPTER V.

THE ELOQUENCE OF THE PULPIT	77
---------------------------------------	----



THE ART OF PUBLIC SPEAKING.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SPEAKING.— ANCIENT AND MODERN ELOQUENCE COMPARED AND CONTRASTED.

ELOQUENCE, though a rare, is not a modern manifestation of thought. In the elder civilizations of Europe, oratory was cultivated as an art, and was a portion of the practical outfit of a public man. Political business was registered, not reported. The necessities of these ages required talkers, and the existence of the demand developed the supply. Oratory became a profession, and Eloquence an art. The means of carrying on political affairs received a far larger share of attention than the ends to be attained by it. The public necessities of the ancient world made their literature oral. The poets declaimed their magnificent epics, their thrilling odes, their glowing hymns, or burning lyrics, at splendid public festivities, in war-camps, at the tables of heroes and dynasts, and round the altars of their country's gods. Nor were "the sweet and solemn-breathing airs" of the authors of "measurable song" alone felicitously breathed into the listening ear. The historian made the assembled Greeks glow and pant, thrill and applaud, when at the august celebrations of their national "games" they met in crowds and thought in multitudes. The stage grew out of this recitative requirement of a bookless age, history developed into tragedy, and satire into comedy—the chorus

taking the bard's place. This mimic representative of life gathered to its service some of the noblest spirits of antiquity, and imparted to spoken literature a notability and dignity which after ages have been unable to attain. The staid philosopher was even fain in those distant times to wed his thoughts to music, or to arrange them for declamatory utterance ; hence Eloquence became the normal form of ancient thought. The great aim was to give each idea grace to attract, force to impress, vigour to fix it in the memory, and make it blend with the hearer's mind. Then thought issued quick, living, newly begotten, with all its mysterious and spontaneous activity from the thinker's spirit, and entered with all the fascination of a freshly created gift into the hearer's heart. The ecstasy of excitement, the energy of vitalized intelligence, and the exquisite exaltation of emotion consequent on the stir of mind, gave Eloquence a matchless charm and a surpassing potency. The anxious, study-worn speaker, moved by many influences, grew as it were with his inborn thought ; the fervour of his emotions was kindled, the whole framework of his body thrilled and tingled with the tremor of his mind's activity ; and as he shed "the consummate flower" of intellectuality along the crowd—himself transformed into one oral, vivid argument and impulse—how could his majestic attitude, his quivering gestures, his flashing eye, his knit features, his expressive and varying intonations, his tiptoed anxiety to influence and persuade, his very livingness, fail to rivet attention, and startle into hitherto unfelt rapturousness the excitable throng, whose spirits lay like an *Æolian* harp trembling under the enchantment of the thought-enriched air which had just been made vocal with his soul's life ?

It is true that it was a dying energy which was thus cast forth upon the embracing atmosphere, but it was thus all the more wondrous in its magic ; for the orator himself seemed spell-bound, filled with some strange, immortal essence, which gathered together the whole energies of his being, and flashed it forth with vigorous impulse into every other spirit. And though the voice died in the distance, and the words faded faster than the flower-leaves which the wind had shaken, yet the intensified life they contained fixed them in the very hearts of those whose bosoms glowed beneath their influence. The voice of Eloquence was not

that of pure thought and calm reflectiveness—it was that of thought filled with the forces and fires of the emotions, touched with the blood-felt enthusiasm of a greatened nature, buoyant with the exhilaration of an excited spirit, vibrating with the very inner energies of life-thought, decked by imagination, vital with passion, and glorified by the plastic art of genius. The whole of the capacities of the ancient orator—intellectual, moral, imaginative, sensitive, and physical—were at once congenialized and unified; and this sublime essence and pith of the human mind, when uttered, was worthily called Eloquence.

Nor was the thought-tossed brain of the thinker, while collocating his ideas and marshalling vocables into organized masses of effective speech, alone busy; the emotional and critical Greeks, by constant usage, had acquired a delicate intellectual power, and a discriminating susceptibility of taste; they were keen-sighted in the detection of faults, and exquisitely subtle in the perception of excellences in the argumentative periods of those intellectual gladiators who, in the assemblies of the people, engaged in the polished arbitrement of debate; or sought to win the applause or wield the destinies of those restless republics, “where grew the arts of war and peace.” Only the resistless spirits of the age could look with unintimidated self-reliance upon those massed crowds of critical listeners, and risk the perilous venture of giving form to opinions in their presence, and by the forth-casting of fit speech dare to inform, exhort, arouse, rebuke, or dissuade men whose lives were spent in making history. The mint and coinage of ordinary minds could not stir the judicial and deliberative Greeks to change. They could weigh, and test, and scorn the little thoughts of unimpressive men, and toss their advice to the passing winds. Another class of minds was effectless on a Greek crowd—profound, earnest, undemonstrative, reflective men—men whose worth consisted in their deep vision, whose gravity put a seal upon their lips among the clamorous throng, and the cautious balance of whose intellects restrained them from taking a one-sided part in any movement. Such men the Greeks could never comprehend—the neutrality of elaborate reflectiveness was never theirs; pure, unimpassioned thought could seldom move them; the statuesque, keen-chiselled logic of speculative minds could

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never charm and overpower their spirits like the richly coloured rhetoric of the eloquent.

In such a state of civilization, "the chief wish of every man was to be a good speaker." The eloquent were the masters of the mind; to them the facile Greeks submitted; on them they lavished political power; by them they were moved or soothed; for them they prepared rewards and crowns; through them all business was managed; and among them all offices, aggrandizements, and honours were distributed. "The tide of words" became all-powerful, and the inhabitants of the Greek republics degenerated, till they became "spectators of words, and hearers of actions," and audiences sitting to listen to the contentions of sophists, rather than men met to deliberate on the management of a commonwealth.

This declension resulted from the emphasis laid upon, and the importance attached to Eloquence as an end instead of a means. When Eloquence becomes an art, tact takes the place of conviction, and men speak to gain their own, not to attain the best, ends. The people criticise the oratory rather than the matter of the oration, and give their suffrage, not to the best adviser, but to the most efficient speaker: sophistry arises, sophists abound, and Eloquence ceases to be *outspokenness*,—in fact, ceases to be, though not to be so named. When Greek oratory became a mere art, it ceased to be a great fact,—its resistless force failed. Roman eloquence, too, while it was invigorated by genuine feeling, interest, and purpose, maintained its nobility and power; but so soon as it substituted the artistic for the actual, it became inane and feeble. It is ever so. Reality is the life of thought; and living thought alone is powerful,—is Eloquence.

We advance the foregoing remarks on ancient Eloquence that we may bring out, with the emphasis of contrast, the distinction between the oratory of the past and of the present time; and that our readers may mark this point particularly, as one having vast issues involved in it, in any discussion on the nature, power, and influence of Eloquence. The ancient orators quickened thought, and intensified its action, by exciting and straining the feelings and emotions,—by employing a varied, ornamented, and impassioned style, and by the prominent and vivid exhibition of their

own vehement, impetuous, and impressive fervour. The pithy force of their expressions caught and charmed the ear with its appropriateness, stirred the emotions, animated the feelings, roused the passions, and so brought the inner faculties of their audiences under the control of the speaker, who used them to dun and din the intellect into active thought. Though close-textured reasoning often underlay the many-hued surface of the stretching web of word-woven reflection, yet the glow and radiance first attracted the attentive interests of Athenian assemblies or Roman crowds. Rhetoric coloured the careful draft which logic drew, and the vivid tints struck the eye before the grace of form was noted. They kindled reason with the fires of passion, and tipped the arrows of their invectives with the venom of their own inflamed hearts.

In modern Eloquence much of this is changed. Indeed, there are few exertions of the mind in which the modifying power of circumstances is more marked than in the means by which the orator of an age like ours "astonishes, enraptures, elevates," and instructs an audience, compared with those which stirred the hearts of the men and nations of those century-hoar eras when Demosthenes uttered his resistless orations, or Cicero declaimed his grand and ample sentences, instinct at once with grace, beauty, and life. The institutions of modern society have imparted a sedateness, temperance, argumentativeness, and business-like tone to many things, and to none more than to Public Speaking. The orator cannot, now-a-days, express the strong conception vitalized by his mind in the full pith and plenitude, with the undeviating directness and thrilling passionate-ness, the moving energy and impulsive variousness which his ideas may possess, but must soothe his mind and smooth his style to the practical level of a colder age;—unless, indeed, some political convulsion, some moral monstrosity, some unexampled event in social life, some spirit-stirring hour occur, in which the mind shakes off the shackles of conventionality, like the withes which bind a fresh-awakened giant; then

"The words of men,
Big with the very motion of their souls,
Declare with what accumulated force
The impetuous nerve of passion urges on
The native weight and energy of things."

As the province of law extends, the surface of civilization is widened, the regularity and simplicity of thought is cultivated, the diffusion of knowledge broadens over the earth, the devotion to business and matters of fact is deepened and intensified, the power as well as the province of Eloquence will be altered. We do not believe that at any time the persuasive influence of oratory will fail; that the fresh-born thought of the dilated soul, that the effluent emotion of the living teacher will ever cease to be efficacious, or resign their functions, before "the sober, gainful arts of modern days:" yet we think that the potent voice of the public speaker must, as a general rule, be subdued and modified, and that he can now only, or at least chiefly, become the master of the heart by acquiring the control of the intellect. Nor do we think that the modern speaker has a less noble function in exercising the best efforts of his skill to form the life and rule the emotions of the society of our own day, than had the professor of Eloquence in the days of old.

The press has had much to do with effecting the modifications which Eloquence has undergone in modern days. The press presents man with a means of communicating with his fellows in another form than that in which, in ancient times, the man of thought required to meet, affect, and excite his comrades in life's pathways. While this opportunity has intensified the individual capacities of the soul, it has lessened the wholeness as well as the wholesomeness of intellectual efforts, and has divorced power from power; so that, in our day, we many times find the best writers of the age ineffective in speech, and our most effective speakers by no means the most thoroughly trained in the arts contributory to argumentative cogency, or accuracy of instantaneous verbal expression.

Extemporaneousness is plenteous enough in the study or the editorial *sanctum*, but it is of a sort which cannot throw itself out and off in the blaze of day, and among crowds. An almost superhuman intuitiveness regarding the causes or issues of events; an extraordinary power of precise thought and concise expression; a marvellous aptitude for popular exposition, are daily displayed in the leading articles of the great journals and periodicals; but the rapid pen quivers, and the trenchant mind is palsied by the mere personal congregating of the public to be addressed; and

the man who could fling his thoughts down upon the broad expanded sheet before him with all but the speed of speech, will falter, and fail, and quail before an audience who wait upon him to expedite those very thoughts along the viewless atmosphere, at a public meeting. Introspection is too active in him, and his own consciousness is too much developed to permit the usual and requisite concentration of ideas to which habit inclines him ; and the disturbing play of the outgoing emotions is too active and engrossing to allow him to use his whole faculty of thought upon the topic under consideration. An orator, on the other hand, feels a passivity and *inertia* of mind congealing and frost-fixing his whole intellect ; unless the glow and animation, the living excitement and inducement of a crowd be before him. His thoughts cannot be wrought up to effectiveness unless his emotions are under the influences of a circle of anxious hearts ready to be subjected in turn to the control of his enthusiasm,—unless an atmosphere of livingness environs him, into which he can impel the energy of an excited and exciting mind. Few have such perfect and unalloyed command of thought, feeling, pulse, frame, physical habit, &c., as to enable them to give full scope to the actual effervescence of the intellect, and in the mere extemporaneity of their mental activity utter the impassioned thought which springs fresh-born from the spirit. The reticence of modern manners is against it. The cause of this may be said, in a great measure, to be the multiplication, in our times, of printed matter,—matter to be read in quiet, and apart from the play and display of passions ; and the consequent tendency in every mind to compare the spoken words with the written style to which we are all so much more accustomed. This comparison operates to cool and depress the emotions of the speaker, and to incline the hearers to judiciousity and calmness. It makes Eloquence, in its ancient sense—outspokenness,—less possible, and, therefore, more rare in modern than in ancient times.

Hence a great error committed in our age in regard to public speaking. In our efforts after the attainment of an oratorical style,—in our criticisms upon those who aim at occupying the senate-house or the forum, the platform, the lecture-desk, or the pulpit, we refer to the old oratory with all its stir, its fearlessness, its passion, fervour, power, flash,

vigour, invective, glow, point, polish, and antithesis, as our model and pattern, forgetful in this of our own altered days and ways. The elder orators had no such dampening practicality as we have to contend against; had no such mere reference to business, fact, interest, and sect to gratify; no such intricately collocated questions to unravel; no such general culture to address; no such comparison with books, treatises, and serials, to fear; and no such criticism of men wielding the vast powers of the daily press to risk, endure, and run the gauntlet of. If we say, then, that modern Eloquence ought to be considerably different from that which moved the aggregated masses of past centuries, we say what facts warrant and experience proves,—that ancient Eloquence cannot rightly be cited either as our “ensample,” or used as the given premises of a just criticism. *Ancient Eloquence was impassioned thought; modern Eloquence is thought impassioned*: the former kindles thought by the emotions; the latter illustrates it by the glare, or lights it on the way by the glow of passion: the one excited passion to incite or induce thought; the other induces thought by reflection, but excites to active ulterior objects by the stimulation of the passions. Ancient Eloquence persuades; modern Eloquence not only persuades, but convinces.

As persuasion was the sole end of ancient Eloquence—and conviction requires to be superadded to that in the efforts of the modern orator—it is evident that the intellect must receive a larger share of the interests, activities, arts, and influence of the modern than of the ancient orator; and hence that modern Eloquence must be characterized in the main by a much greater amount of intellectuality than that of the ages and times when men in general thought and read less, were more impulsive, and more easily stirred to passionate activity, and quickened to exerted life. Then the good, the advantageous, the politic, the plausible, were more frequently urged; now the true, the right, the just, the honourable, and the elevating, are more strenuously maintained. The progress of man has imported into the possible motives by which men may be stimulated higher and holier, nobler and clearer truths; has made effective for active excitement a wider area of his being; and has brought within reach of the orator a much more exalted species of mind. The passions are probably not less active

now than then, but they are less exclusively subject to bestirment; the sensibilities are not only more acute, but more refined; the intellect is subjected to higher culture and to holier laws; the will is less excitable and more easily controlled:—in fact, the whole nature of man has been more duly exercised, and less left to barren wastefulness and idle inanity. The centuries have not passed without distilling into society influences of a diviner character than Homer sung, Plato taught, Demosthenes employed, or Sophocles represented; than Virgil could conceive, Horace act upon, or Cicero express. As these have permeated and pervaded life, politics, society, books, talk, and men, they have induced changes in them all. These changes again, by action and reaction, have impressed the individual natures of men, and made them more susceptible of the kindlier touches of humanity, more prompt to move to the measures of charity, more decided in their love of freedom, not as a mere personal possession, but as affording a possibility for the outgrowth and development of man in the entirety of his being. These changes demand from the modern orator full recognition; and, if rightly comprehended, would aid him greatly in the adaptation of his means to the ends he proposes. The Eloquence of the present day must make the conviction of the intellect its peculiar care, and use suasion and persuasion upon the emotions and the will only in subordination to the conviction of the reasonable nature of man.

CHAPTER II.

PARLIAMENTARY ELOQUENCE; ITS AIM, PLACE, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS.

COMMONWEALTH is the most accurate and adequate name for a well-governed state. It denotes a civil polity to which men have agreed, and in obedience to which they live; while it connotes that the interest, the advantage, and the happiness of the people in general are cared for in and subserved by it; that it provides and preserves the greatest possible amount of present and prospective well-being. Self-reliance and self-defence, either in indi-

viduals or in states, afford the best safeguards and secure the greatest immunity from evil—or, at least, supply the most effective means for reducing its influences to a minimum. They also constitute the most reliable guarantees for prosperity, peace, justice, and progress. “Out of this nettle, Danger, they pluck the flower, Safety;” and thence they sow the seeds of future strength, security, and honour.

That commonwealth is ideally best which secures, provides, encourages, and incites in its members the greatest activity of individual energy of mind, vigour of character, and originality of effort. Where the utmost activity of the selfhood of each, that is compatible with the safety and happiness of all, is admitted and secured, the state approximates as nearly as possible to a community, in its highest and best sense; for by that means only can the largest possible combination of order, permanence, and progress be attained. The state is ultimately dependent upon the condition of the people for the *status* it can hold among empires; and, in the last resort, a commonwealth will only acquire and retain that place in human affairs of which the people whom it represents is found worthy. All governments are, in this sense, *representative*. A despotism chiefly represents will or force, —the will of the sovereign, and the force of the people; but this only when both are in accord. A republic chiefly embodies in the diplomatist’s thought, sympathy, but sympathy which may knit itself together into force, and utter itself in will. A constitutional monarchy exhibits a combination of will and sympathy, as force. The former issues effectively from the decisions of the executive; and the latter is made interferingly operative by the expression of the voice of the people, so far as the constitution permits and provides for the manifestation of public opinion, as an instrument of legal influence in the administration of affairs, and as a help amidst

“ The grinding cares,
The perils and the doubts that wait on *power*.”

Representative government implies the effective legalized expression of public opinion by persons formally chosen and properly accredited to act for their constituents in

national affairs, so as to secure the accurate and deliberate investigation of all measures propounded for the attainment of the objects of the government, before they are sanctioned and put into force. The special form of the provision made for the effectual action of public opinion, sympathy, and intelligence, upon the executive or administrative department of a government, constitutes, in our days, almost the only, at least the main distinction between state and state; for all have now fallen by custom, necessity, or choice, into some mode of permitting or inviting representative influence—at any rate, in emergencies,—and each is made amenable, in some shape or other, to the judicial, if not always judicious action of public opinion. “Men,” as Burke said, “are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies.” These constitute their nationalities; these blend them in unity of feeling, and give them a community of interest. These excite in them similarities of thought, and thought aspires to subdue the dominion of mere strength, to vindicate its own existence by harmonizing law with reason, enforced duty with inflexible justice, and to plant in the core of society generosity and truth, instead of fear and fraud. We believe that the government, which most freely admits of thoughtful and intelligent participation in the actual business of deliberation and action for the common good, is both nobler and safer than one which shrinks from allowing public opinion its due share in the guidance of the decisions of governments, or ignores the action of popular feeling, and defies the growing might of a nation’s mind.

The nature of the means, opportunities, and agencies for bringing the force of public opinion to bear upon the good management of the affairs of a nation, affects and alters eloquence in each state, and ought to modify the view taken of it. To apply similar canons of criticism to dissimilar though somewhat analogous things, is unjust to the object exposed to animadversion, and inimical to the attainment of the end which the critic proposes to himself, or the reader expects at his hand—Truth.

Administration, if it is the mere fulfilment of the ordinances of a single mind, whether that of an age-grey inheritance or a bran-new success, even when it seeks

counsel regarding the best possible plan of attaining the end in view, may be an easy task, so long as it manages to retain passivity among, or impress non-resistance upon the populace ;—in which word we include all submitting and unhelping subjects to that government. In such a state, deliberation need have little utterance, and eloquence may sink to nought. Should difficulties arise, and the exigency transcend the ordinary functions of private councillors, or the *pro formâ* advisers of the Will in which the state is incarnated, the voice of deliberation may be heard in the halls of the deputies, but will scarcely ever reach, in their whole force and truth, the ears of the people. Exposition and exhortation will be the predominant form of utterance, and statesmanly thought will couch itself into the language of narration, expend itself in double-meaning epigram, or scorch, without scathing, by covert satire or overdone adulation ; but eloquence, as outspokenness, must dwine, and droop, and lose the very sap of its being. If, again, deliberation must forerun and determine the special details of administration, it will frequently happen that vagrancy of speech may be over-indulged in, and a mere flux of controversy, a make-believe anxiety for the commonweal, or a crotchety and conceited desire for personal notoriety, may delay or frustrate the schemes of the administration, even when these are best adapted to the time, circumstance, and object. When a deliberative assembly is a mere congress of opinions, the entertainers of each of which are eager chiefly for the ventilation of their specific, and clamorous especially for notice, there is a tendency to the simulation of watchfulness and statesmanliness, to the endeavour to appear serviceable to the body politic, and influential in the council of the nation, which causes eloquence to degenerate into verbiage, to turn into quibbles and tact, to swell into bombast, and perish of flatulence. And if, in a mere advising body, a body whose counsels are confined to a determination, not of *what* ought to be done, but of *how* what is to be done may be most effectively accomplished, there is little opportunity for the true, free, and fearless utterance of thought, *i. e.*, outspokenness, as eloquence ; in a mere assembly of “temporizers, waiters upon occasion and opportunity, compromisers, oscillators,” possessors of marketable talent or influence, persons of hireable effrontery or

efficiency, partisans and proselytizers, speculators on public credulity, and candidates for pay, place, patronage, or popularity, there may be much outspokenness, yet little eloquence; for such men would use—

“The whitest moment in the web of time,”

to twirl their florid and fatiguing sentences before the house, and get them written, as if they were masterpieces of thought and diction, into the current history of the day as reported in the newspapers, or inscribed as precious utterances of statesmanly oracularity in the voluminous records of the chambers, and worthy of a place in the memories of men among the sayings of those mighty thinkers, whose

“Words further actions,
And are the fruitful yet mysterious seed
Whence causes bud, grow ripe, and burst to harvest.”

Parliament may for our present purpose be defined as any fixed and constitutional body, or congeries of bodies, possessed at once of power, influence, ability, and right to act as trustees of the interests of the people of a nation; to advise with, control, assist, or initiate action in the executive of a government; to express the opinions, enforce the wishes, explain the wants, and urge the claims of the different sections of the body corporate; to bring under consideration and discussion the various interests, however clashing, real or apparently, in order that they may be brought into harmony, unison, and combined workability; and not only to direct the administration as to what it shall determine on compelling the people to obey, but also directly or indirectly to enforce upon the people a due obedience to the decisions of the supreme power, so far as these have been come to in accordance with the advice, co-operation, intent, and will of its members. Any such body or combination of bodies must be, to be effectual, in a greater or less degree representative. It must possess influence and relationship, not only with the sovereignty, however named and formed, but also with the great mass of subject-men; and it must have so much interest in common with the utmost extremes of society as to be able to effect a real cohesion among all the differing parties

and sections in the State, while yet it is, in itself, in great measure, the creation—so far as its individual component parts are concerned—of the voluntary consent, will and adhesion of the people whose delegated power it wields, whose influence it exerts and organizes, whose will it more or less expresses, and whose interests it does or should protect. Any national assembly or assemblies, in short, any aggregate of persons, acting as the great court of ultimate efficiency in transacting the business of a nation, may be called, so far at least as our object is concerned, a parliament.

Parliament is the Supreme Council of the nation. In the progress of the ages its legislative power has become more prominent in our thoughts than its deliberative nature; and we have fallen into the habit of looking upon it rather as a meeting of sages to enact laws, and to decide upon the state and posture of the national concerns, than of representatives of the estates, expressing (and sometimes enforcing) the opinions of the people on matters affecting law, government, police, war, peace, international relations, colonial interests, and taxation. This is a very natural mistake in our time. The public now has—or fancies it has—another and a better organ in the press. There rests, however, on the representative of the people, or the holder of a peerage, a sense of personal responsibility to the country and to the Sovereign, with which we cannot endow the press. Parliament is a corporate power, possessing rights and privileges both by law and custom. It has a tenure, not only of office, but of duty. It is the embodied will of the people, because it is the personalized opinion of the estates of the realm. The need and obligation of consistent and reasonable thought and action, in regard to the affairs of the State, sit more closely to the soul, and act more directly upon the consciences of members of parliament than of writers for the press. The unity, too, of Parliament, or what is called “the spirit of the House,” places a check upon the *chosen* advisers of the Sovereign in “the despatch of business” to a far greater extent than the *esprit de corps* binds and restrains the daily advisers of the people. In fact, the press is an ideal, the Parliament a real entity. When the press chides Parliament for “its much speaking,” and urges it to greater activity of performance, we think its objection is void of real relevancy.

Parliament is a conference. It meets to advise upon measures ; speech, therefore, is one of its functions. But it should be thoughtful speech, the honest and true utterance of statesmanly reflection ; for then only is speech worthy of the designation—oratory.

In all parliamentary assemblies business must be transacted by speech, although the *res gesta*, or gist, may, in their results, be afterwards reduced to writing. Speech is a parliamentary necessity—freedom of speech, if possible ; if not, as much as can be taken or gained. Wherever speech is employed in circumstances which may excite emotion in the speaker, or demand the arousing of passion in the hearers, eloquence is possible. The very fundamental purpose of a parliament, therefore, implies a likelihood for the need and use of eloquence.

To speak with the full consciousness of having mastered any subject, and made ourselves well acquainted with all the matters, near or remote, affected by the topic under consideration ; to show ourselves fully provided with proof upon proof of the accuracy of our opinions ; and to display a candid and unprejudiced criticism of the pleas of the opposition, are great merits in a speaker. To add to these the tact of winning men over to our views, by the employment of elegance of phrase, the effective disposition of arguments, and the use of strikingly apposite illustrations, or of analogies and sentiments capable of being instantly apprehended by the audience, uttered in a natural and sincere tone and manner, may gain for a man the title of an orator. But he who, in apparently unpremeditated phrase, expresses the present thought fresh from the invisible spirit, beating with the very pulses of the heart, and hot with the hasty breathing of passion ; who seems without artificial aids to rise to the height of any argument at a single act and rebound of thought, forces his way with vehement quickness and the warmth elicited by that rapidity, through, as it were, a crowd of thoughts, using those only which suit his immediate purpose, and dashing others aside in impatience, as he strives for utterance, pants along his course, keeping the order and method of his exposition always clear, and by the exquisite intensity of his own progress excites within others the sympathetical resistlessness,—

“ That from the wisest steals their best resolves,”

is eloquent. His quick conception, good sense, and just discernment ; the beauty, force, and pertinence of his expressions ; the animation, involuntariness and emotional vehemence, of his delivery,—all combine to hurry on an audience into a concurring sympathy, and to press into the spirit the feelings which shall impel thought in them to follow in the grooves cut out by the energetic forerunner to whose influences they have for the time involuntarily succumbed.

Such a manner of speech, when employed in the conduct and management of public affairs, in the great court of the nation, we denominate, for want of a better phrase, parliamentary eloquence ; and the object of this chapter—and that which closely follows it—is to describe the main characteristics, to define the chief forms, to indicate the governing principles, and to note the mistakes made in, as well as the abuses of, the eloquence of the senate. In attempting this we have a threefold object :—First, to settle and define in our readers' minds the nature, extent, and limits of the deliberative eloquence employed in houses of parliament, however designated ; second, to fix some reasonable criterion for judging of, and therefore of praising, dispraising, of acting upon or neglecting, of being satisfied or dissatisfied with, the forms of eloquence made use of in the exigencies of the state by those representative men to whom the destinies of the nation as a body corporate have been, for the time being, entrusted ; and third, to show the continual presence and prevalence of the great doctrines of the rhetoricians, the power and efficacy of attention to their expositions of the means and appliances of persuasive speech ; and to illustrate or prove how far the change predicated in our previous chapter, however overlooked by the retailers of the traditions of the past ages on this matter, is valid and true,—more especially in our own country under the parliamentary forms of the Commons and Lords in the procedures of public business in this the highest platform of eloquence possible to men whose views are confined to the mundane and the actual—

“ The cares and mighty troubles of the times.”

The *theory* of the British constitution is, that the three independent powers—the Sovereign, the Lords, and the

Commons—act constantly as checks on each other, and so, by the inter-activity, as it were, of spring, wheels, and pinions, perform the motion-work of government, while in their respective relationships they form the going-train of political watchfulness. The Sovereign Power, as being almost impersonal, a mysterious idea yet a constitutional force, is by grace of fixed laws surrounded by a sanctity and inviolability which, so far as our purpose goes, takes it out of our province; for it is supposed to be disinterested, and therefore passionless, and released from the need, the inducement, or the opportunity of using eloquence. There remain, therefore, for our consideration only two elementary parts of the constitutional managers of national affairs,—the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. It is no part of our present purpose to analyze the components of these assemblies, nor to define with precision or adequacy their respective functions and the limits which bound them. Our duty is to view them as representative assemblies, co-operating in the framing of measures likely to prove effective for the successful oncarrying of the different transactions which constitute national life. The one assembly, not less than the other, from our present special point of view, though not in quite the same degree, must be regarded as a representative assembly,—the former as the representative of station, birth, property, wealth, eminence, and cultured refinement in the commonwealth, of the titled and untitled aristocracy (meaning *class* of persons), who hold the height and top of dignity; the latter as the representative of the restless energy, the up-surging industry, the professions, occupations, and trades (in the *commercial* sense), the local influence and popularity, the personally acquired wealth or delegated power of the great mass of men and means,—not of the democracy (*i.e.*, the *common* people), but, to coin a word in our exigency, the mediocracy, or middle classes.

The members of the House of Lords have in most cases the right of self-representation, and hold their seats by an hereditary, or at least a life tenure, the chief exceptions being the Scottish peers and the Irish bishops. It is less changeable in its constituent elements, and the position of its members is more distinctly and definitely marked than the Commons. It also contains within it almost every variety of character; and though its proceedings are cha-

racterized by greater dignity, repose, and grace than the other House, it is not unfrequently the scene of much animated and caustic eloquence, when the advocates of great principles grapple in contest, and spring into the controversies of the day, with the vigour of thinkers and the active energy of wrestlers. The House of Commons—as every person who has visited both may have remarked, however strange the mention of it may seem—is neither so motley in appearance nor so easy in its movements as the Upper House. Most of the members of the former possess a capacity for making themselves popular in their own neighbourhood, and at least among their own constituents. They are, therefore, mostly men of presence, energy, influence; men who have made their weight felt in their own circles; men of ambition and pronounced individuality, often crotchety, self-willed, and even stubborn; yet not unfrequently deficient in taste, manners, and even culture, as a refining agency. Being, as they are, indeed, the choice of a majority of men lumped together by the mere accident of local residence within a given electoral district, they are not all men of such select ability, character, position, and demeanour as the theory of a parliamentary representation at first sight suggests; yet they are in reality, in a great measure, a collection of remarkable men,—men above the average in intelligence, personality, and appearance; men, therefore, in whom interest, passion, sympathy, power, thought, special aims, are keen and active; men in whom life is often at high pressure. Such men are potentially eloquent, and when subject, occasion, and end are suitable, can seldom fail to make their mark, in some department of policy, among their fellows. The Lower House, therefore, is likely to contain more of the rude, untrained vigour of phrase and force of pertinacity, than the Higher, which is more prone to skilful and polite duels in the form of debates.

The consideration of parliamentary eloquence is complicated by many accidental peculiarities, each of which requires to be taken into account and allowed for—peculiarities pertaining to the persons speaking, to the audience addressed, and to the far wider circle now virtually present in the two departments of the senate through the agencies of the press—peculiarities resulting from the inter-relations

of governments through diplomacy, from the double connection of the ministry with the parliament and the sovereign, and from the position, from time to time, of the parties into which politicians are divided.

Rhetoric is, or rather may be, practically defined as the science and art by which men are taught the best means of gaining the end they have in view, by persuading others to act according to the wishes of the speaker, or, more shortly, of effecting one's purpose by speech. Eloquence is the highest manifestation of rhetorical skill. In ordinary circumstances, the plainest and fewest possible words are used to impart the sentiments of a speaker, and the order of the phraseology is such as most clearly and briefly to make known the ideas he wishes to transfer from his own into another's mind. But in eloquence it is not so much or mainly the idea as the purpose of the speaker which covets transfer. The rule and method of eloquence, therefore, are quite distinct from those of ordinary composition. The latter seeks the mere passage of thought; the former demands the submission of the will, and dominion over the designs and acts of men: it has a double charge and message—one to the judgment, which it seeks to turn; the other to the will, which it desires to sway. The words of the eloquent, therefore, go forth as mutual influences with their passion, and sometimes are so charged with the purposes which excites the mind that, to the great failure of their intent, they

“Stoop with oppression of their prodigal weight.”

This, rhetoric endeavours to teach men to avoid. It supposes each man honestly anxious to effect his own ends, and it supplies cautions and precautions as to the means employed by the speaker while engaged in working out his designs upon his hearers. These may be regarded as referring to method only; but method itself depends upon preceding considerations, and is governed by such thoughts as are suggested by the subject, the occasion, and the end.

On the *subject* depends the topics to be employed in argument, the motives to be impressed upon the mind, the principles upon which the reasonings to be enforced must be grounded, and the passions which may be influenced to produce the intended effect on the hearers. So far as sub-

jects are concerned, there can be little want of suitable material in parliament. The fate of kingdoms and peoples, the prosperity of commerce, the stability of agriculture, the happiness of men, depend upon the topics debated in the legislature. The utility or inutility of measures, the advisability or inadvisability of change, the maintenance or encouragement of right, the denunciation of wrong, and all the multiplicity of questions arising out of the history of the past, the occurrences of the present, or the hopes and fears foreshadowed for the future, may all occupy the deliberations of the senate, and each affords opportunities and themes for eloquence. In so far as subject is concerned, the pulpit alone possesses a supremacy of theme, and even that elevated interest does not always serve to make it more potent, because it is defective in the felt immediacy of the pressure for decision ; while in the loftier regions of politics a fair opportunity may be taken of importing into the question those hallowing influences and sacred principles which are the all but exclusive themes of the priesthood of every sect and party. Hence, in advising upon parliamentary—as indeed on all other—eloquence, the intelligent rhetorician introduces considerations derived from the special subjects which lie open to the active mind for speech, and makes his rules depend upon the matter. He never advises the casting of all spoken thought into the same moulds—he recommends *system*, but not an all-ruling and ever the same system.

The *occasion* and attendant *circumstances* of parliamentary eloquence materially influence the nature of the advice to be given regarding, or the judgment to be passed on any special effort of a senator ; and therefore they are justly regarded by the rhetorician as elements which should weigh with and affect the speaker in the exposition and co-ordination of his ideas. The state of parties in the country and in the Houses, the condition of public opinion, the agitation of the question by the press, the requirements of the age and time, the exigency in which the consideration of the subject becomes necessary or advisable, the curiosity which stimulates feeling, and sets passion on edge, the controversy to which opinions may be exposed, the sharpening of the intellect which the circumstances excite, the position occupied by the speaker, the extent of the bearing of the subject

upon internal events or external alliances, and the necessities of diplomatic, administrative, or party reserve which may hedge round the topic, and supply or withdraw arguments, facts, or influences from usage at the time,—these all require to be carefully and judiciously thought over, and should determine not only what *may*, or *should*, but also what *must* be said. These suggest both preconsideration and reconsideration. By the former we find out what to say, how to arrange it in order suitably adjusted to the occasion, and imprint it on the memory; and by the latter we learn how to set it forth with effect—clothed with beauty, dignity, and power,—and how to deliver it with tact, appropriateness, and efficacy.

The *end* to be attained also occupies a conspicuous preliminary place in the rhetorical arrangement and methodization of speech. In ordinary circumstances, to move for the moment and to conquer in a division is all that a member of the legislature aims at; perhaps not even so high as this may be his mark. He may wish only to air a crotchet, or ride a hobby, or publish an opinion; less even, he may intend only to show his constituents and the public that he can talk, or take part in what Cobbett used to call “the unprofitable conversation of parliament.” For such trivial ends the rhetorician merely prescribes modesty, tact, discrimination, brevity, and common sense. But when great parliamentary principles are involved, when national questions are in agitation, when parties quiver and placemen shake, when policy is to be changed or dictatorship checked, when finance is to be reformed or rights defended, when wrongs are to have redress claimed for them, or international alliances are to be subjected to scrutiny, when good is to be maintained or evil prevented,—then art strives against art, and aim against aim, and, that the trim strong arm of right and truth may win in such a fray, rhetoric burnishes the weapons, sharpens their edge, secures their temper, teaches their use, and indicates the modes of fence, offence, defence, and defiance possible to him who has his mind made up, and who is prepared to employ, as directed, “weapons which are at once sharp, massive, and refulgent; which, like heaven’s artillery, dazzle while they strike, which overpower the sight and the heart at the same instant.”

There are boundaries assigned by Nature to all passions,

and there are uses for them all in the great mystery of life of which we have a share, if we could but mark their due and proper place and purpose. The object of the passions is to incline us to or from any particular course, to release us from the more tardy processes of reason, and to give an instantaneity of action to man. Of course, were reason truly cultured, it would command each passion and rule all at will, and, having once laid down the law of duty, would insist on obedience. But the urgency and speed of the passions is so great as to outrun reason, and to foreclose the question of duty before the operations of logic are perfected; and whether the passion be naturally good or bad, it acts alike against the judicious arguing out of any debatable matter;—

“For pleasure and revenge,
Have ears more deaf than adders to the voice
Of any true decision.”

To gain any given end by speech requires a due and conjoint use of reason and passion, and the rhetorician instructs us how to bring them into alliance and simultaneous as well as consentaneous action; to give it stereoscopic solidity, that is, to look at it with intellect and passion, and so to present it in speech as it is likely to do in daily life—affecting both. He also provides guards against letting slip the thongs which hold the triple leash of reason, passion, and speech, or of doing anything likely to operate against an immediate and favourable suffrage on the point desired. To know the end for which eloquence is to be employed is, therefore, requisite, before the rules of rhetoric can be advantageously appealed to, regarding the method and arrangement of discourse; and a knowledge of the real end which overruled its method is necessary to a right criticism of any public speech.

Taken into consideration combinedly the three matters now defined, and to some extent explained, Parliamentary eloquence might be said to be capable of taking the following forms, viz.:—1. Expository; 2. Critical; 3. Deliberative; 4. Hortative; 5. Invective; 6. Defensive;—to which we might, perhaps, add another species, *i.e.*, Formal, or Make-believe. Each of these forms requires specific definition and consideration, but we may here formulate some of the interfering influences to which parliamentary eloquence

is subject, in many, if not in all, these forms and manifestations, viz. :—

- | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------------|---|
| | | { The <i>character</i> of the speaker.
The <i>position</i> he occupies in the house, &c.
The <i>party</i> to which he adheres or inclines.
The <i>constituency</i> , &c., he represents.
The <i>speciality</i> for which he is known. |
| I. Personal | | |
| | | { Diplomatic.
a. Reserve { Administrative.
Party. |
| | | { b. Aims.
c. Feelings.
d. Occasion.
e. Class Interests.
f. Office. |
| | I. Intra-parliamentary | |
| II. Circumstantial | | |
| | | { 1. Public opinion.
2. Feeling of constituency.
3. Liability to criticism.
4. State of parties <i>outside</i> .
5. Imminence of re-election.
6. Personal reputation. |
| | II. Extra-parliamentary | |

CHAPTER III.

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELOQUENCE
DEFINED AND EXPLAINED.

To advise is to use speech to prevail upon another, or others, to adopt a course in agreement with our opinions of fitness or right. To confer is to meet for consultation upon matters on which there is a fair likelihood of difference of opinion, and, consequently, of an intellectual (or other) disagreement, in order that, after due consideration, a harmony or unity, of a greater or less number, but of at least more than the half, may be brought about. In all true conference there must be statement of several opinions, and examination by comparison of these statements. This comparative examination will lead to discussion, and to the assignment of reasons for the preferential adoption of each given opinion. Each, in so far as he honestly holds his opinion, must wish to see it accepted as true or beneficial; and hence, if he speaks at all, must speak to gain his end. To represent is to act as deputy for a given interest, and as

delegate from a special body. We cannot adequately perform the duty of a substitute or agent without in some form or other making known and appreciable the opinions or wishes of those represented; and do not truly act for them unless we strive to effect the main purposes on which they have fixed their hearts. Hence, to attain an end is the express object of all representative speech.

It seems, therefore, to follow, that the general, *i. e.*, the prevailing *character* of parliamentary language should be that it is eloquent at least in the sense of being thought outspoken for the attainment of a given end.

Parliamentary eloquence has for its special function the maintenance of truth, right, law, justice, &c., among men. The peculiar interests which are confided to the management of the supreme council are so serious and important as to demand the most assiduous care in endeavouring to work them to such an issue as shall bring into harmony the convictions of men and the decisions of the legislature. To do this effectively it is necessary to explain the principles upon which change is advocated, or on which it is resisted, with care, honesty, and ability; to criticise the objections taken to the *status in quo*, or the opinions advanced regarding what is preferable; to state the arguments on each side calmly, fairly, tersely, popularly; to use all possible just arts to induce and incline the advocates to abandon, or the opponents to resist, the proposed measures; to declaim against the form, the means, the intentions, of the advisers of innovation, or the resisters of improvement; and to defend with fervency and warmth the grounds upon which the party, with whom we link ourselves upon the particular point or topic under discussion, conduct the controversy, and hold their opinion. Sometimes to gain time for another to get ready to speak, and sometimes, too, it is requisite to make a show of rebutting objections, or advancing arguments, when the only object is to instruct and inform outsiders upon the matter—sometimes it is even thought advisable to speak in the House when the person has nothing to say, only to appear attentive to the business of the House, and to gratify friends, patrons, or constituents. Any or all of these purposes may give form to a parliamentary speech—very frequently a simultaneous combination of several of them operate to-

gether. It becomes evident, then, that there must be several specific classes of deliberative oratory, as well as many varieties of address, in legislative assemblies, springing from the blending of two or more of these specific classes into a new form. It is impossible, however, to elaborate rules for all the possible permutations of style of which oratory is capable; and we must confine our attention to the simpler and more distinct forms, in order that we may fix more thoroughly in thought the specific characteristics of each class. We purpose, therefore, to define as briefly and carefully as we can the chief varieties of parliamentary eloquence, and, by noting their main elements, enable our readers to judge of oratory from a knowledge of the principles on which it depends.

I. *Expository*.—Expository discourse is employed to make statements of facts, to supply an abstract of some foregone occurrence or debate, to explain in detail the opinions of the speaker, or to describe the proceedings upon which any motion is to be founded, or from which the propriety or impropriety of a course of action, whether past or future, is to be judged. It is, of course, chiefly narrative and explanatory, and its main object is either to inform or to produce belief in the essential accuracy of the view given and the opinions enforced. In such speech there need be no straining after novelty of form; an easy and idiomatic style, the words of which are simple and exact, the collocations of which are precise and perspicuous, the flow of which is discursive and animated, and a mildly earnest, yet pretty sedate elocution will, in general, best fit the utterance of an expository discourse.

The chief constructive elements to be attended to are, the *selection* and the *arrangement* of the facts, opinions, &c. These should, in general, receive the order of time for facts, and that of logical consecution for opinions. The salient points alone ought to receive pre-eminence; and tedious particularity, unless under special circumstances, should be carefully avoided. These should be so allocated as to admit of a ready and easy transition from part to part, and yet be so built together as to produce a cumulative impression, heightening always towards the close. Each section of such a discourse ought to lead to, and necessitate, the next; each should deal with a distinct subject distinctly;

and the whole, unitedly, though they need not, exhaust the topic, must present such a view of the entire subject as might justify, if not demand, decision.

These moral elements seem essential to expository discourse, viz., *fidelity* as to statements, and *impartiality* in their exhibition. Any appearance of what is called "making a case" tends materially to lessen the effect of a narrative, descriptive, or enunciatory speech; and honour and honesty possess a vigour of their own, which we ought always to endeavour to bring over to our side. Good temper and unstrained promptness may co-exist with, and be employed in, even a hostile marshalling of facts or thoughts; and modest firmness, as well as exact and unmistakable pertinence, may add force and pungency to a defensive detail of matters of fact, policy, or purpose.

Exposition need not dispense with ornament. The words should be expressive and well chosen; the sentences should be skilfully rounded and harmoniously balanced; and the length and style of the several paragraphs ought to be judiciously varied. Yet it is desirable that any appearance of minute care, elaborate arrangement, or exquisite polish of diction should be avoided, and as far as possible we must labour against incurring a suspicion of subordinating any portion of the details on which we enter to the requirements of proportion, elegance, grace, or selection. The more credit we gain for art, the less we shall get for candour and correctness and honesty.

The form which an expository discourse will preferentially assume will consist of an exordium, showing the necessity of the statement to be made, the importance of accuracy and truth, and making a claim upon attention. The state of the subject, at the point where it is taken up, will naturally form a matter for observation, and the narrative portion will follow that order of selection already determined upon. The peroration may usually conciliate objectors, and maintain the substantial integrity of the statements made, defend the form of exposition adopted, and indicate the aspect which the topic should assume after the matter addressed to the hearers has been duly reflected upon or taken into consideration.

II. *Critical*.—Criticism is the exercise of the discerning, distinguishing, and judging faculties, for the purpose of

leading to, or pronouncing a decision upon, the correctness and accuracy of some matter placed before the mind for examination. It consists in the application of some principles of determination as the touchstone and test of the value, or worthlessness, of that which is placed before us for note or comment. It is examinative and estimative. It requires us to balance and assay objections, and to expose to search and trial the elements and parts of which the matter before us is composed, and to penetrate into the very heart of the subject, that we may see and know the life, vigour, and power it possesses. The critic's function is to state the grounds of acceptance or rejection; to touch with the potent analysis of logic the sophisms (if any) sought to be palmed upon the unwary; and to bring into operation such determinate tests as shall give ample evidence of the validity of just arguments or true statements.

The rules of just criticism are not arbitrary; and the laws of logic, when well known and used, form at once the tenderest and most remorseless principles of judgment to which men's efforts can be subjected; for they are the unbiassed decisions of nature. They cannot, therefore, swerve from the firm-fixed decisions with which they are endowed and for which they are marked, through private grudge, cruelty, jealousy, or hate. In critical discourse, therefore, every principle should be distinctly stated, and its bearing upon the point or points at issue ought to receive accurate note. All caprice must be avoided. Just reasoning, supported by genuine induction, and illustrated by fair analogy methodically brought before the mind, can alone satisfy the critical investigator.

The grounds of critical decision are:—1st, Intuition, or personal conviction—immediate conscious perception. 2nd, Evidence, *i. e.*, mediate or immediate proof of the very point or fact at issue. 3rd, Authority, *i. e.*, acquiescence in the expressed belief, opinion, or statement of others; acceptance of documents, narrations, or personal witnesses, as proof sufficient for the purpose in hand. 4th. The results of the operations of the syllogistic faculty when in accordance with, and derived from, a right observance of the laws of inferential thought.

Criticism may pursue either the order of *investigation*, or the order of *proof*. Criticism always implies the present

indeterminateness or hypothetical uncertainty of the matter before it. It is only on this assumption that it is amenable to test. The test to which it may be exposed depends on the nature of the case advanced in its behalf. If the argument be that certain antecedents being granted certain consequents do result, will result, or have resulted; or that a certain principle being accepted, certain results follow from it, we may criticise, 1st, the propriety of granting the antecedents; 2nd, the necessary involution of the consequents; or, 3rd, the direct colligation of so many of the granted antecedents, with so many of the alleged consequents; or we may question the accuracy of the principle,—which will throw us back to the induction on which it depends, or maintain the irrelevancy of the results—which will necessitate a revisal of the syllogistic process which it involves. On the contrary, if the argument be that certain consequences actually exist, and are the results of certain antecedents, we may question the existence of the consequences, as explained, or impugn the validity of the connection asserted to co-exist between them,—in other words, we may deny the alleged facts, or institute an examination of the reasoning employed to connect certain effects with certain causes as their sole or proportionally combined products.

The groundwork of all critical discourse must, therefore, be reasonable, and its form must partake much more of a logical than a rhetorical cast. Clearness, judicious arrangement, keen incisiveness of intellect, and a quick play of the mind in the grooves of a fixed logic, are the chief characteristics of such eloquence.

The style proper to such eloquence will be precise and lucid, without complication of parts, or embarrassment of the arranged elements. The diction will be choice, forcible, expressive, and distinct. The form into which the sentences crystallize will be natural, logical, and pertinently knit. The sequence of sentences should be direct and judicious. The paragraphs will cohere by sharp but clearly perceptible joinings, delicately shaded, and yet nicely distinct. A critical speech will generally begin by conciliating attention, and showing reasons for pursuing the inquiry. It will state the grounds of judgment, and apply them to the topic under investigation. It will distinguish

statements from opinions, and test each separately. It will then examine the relation or irrelatlon of facts to the opinions advanced ; and conclude with a series of inferences, which may be drawn from the process of thought of which the speech has been the exponent and expression.

III. *Deliberative*.—Deliberation implies a more mature, steady, and painstaking exercise of judicially than criticism. It aims at reaching a definite conclusion. It also admits of the balance and the inquisition of thought, but it is more earnest to find and take the most suitable conclusion attainable. It is a serious and sedate exercise of political sagacity, logical skill, and inventive resource. On the occurrence of a political question, a problem in national affairs, the practised mind perceives at once a whole tribe of arrangements, plans, contrivances, schemes, laws, institutions, and adaptations by which a solution would become possible ; but the statesman, at the same time, finds himself enmeshed in such an entire circle of enactments, laws, forms, opinions, parties, interests, activities, usages, &c., as causes him to halt.

“ Such precedents are numberless : we draw
Our right from custom. Custom is a law
As high as heaven,—as wide as sea or land.”

There is a wide choice of available courses, each good, perhaps, considered in itself, but taken in comparison, or in combination, requiring a wise discretion in the selector. The man of one idea perceives the evil, and its remedy, and sets out for the attainment of his object in a course as straight as the crow flies, seldom taxing his mind regarding the alternative methods of dealing with the subject, or evading it, which suggest themselves to a student of legislation and the practical statesman. The latter inevitably acquires the habit of looking upon most specific solutions of political problems as at best but specious, and he is hence trained to look deliberately at all the questions, and to view each one as only the standpoint from which the reasons for preference may be noted, or the basis of an attack may be found.

“ All propositions for change of policy, for reforms in the constitution of Parliament, the church, the courts of justice, the army and the navy, the administrative departments, or for amendments of the law, necessarily involve, in the first

place, the comparison between the retention of the existing state of things, without alteration, and the proposed remedy; and, secondly, they involve, in general, a comparison of several remedies. The first step is to decide that a change is expedient; the next is to select, out of several alternative remedies, proposed by different persons, that one which is best suited to the circumstances of the case.”*

There is room, therefore, for a large amount of critical discourse in any display of deliberative eloquence; but the former merely implies examination, while the latter involves selection, preference, and adjudication. Criticism has a less definite aim, and may be exercised on all the alternatives presented to the thoughts upon a subject,—an ultimate decision is not demanded of the critic. But in deliberation we expect to find the mind prepared to propose and pursue some “open and traversable” path amidst the conflicting alternatives of politics, to point out the immediately right and proper course, and to advise towards a determination. It is not supposed that equilibrium of argumentation can be maintained; but that, in the long run, some reasons may be found which must weigh down the judgment, and so settle the matter. Deliberative oratory requires wide and ready knowledge, a suave and serious style, careful logical division and distinctness, copious illustration, drawn from constitutional practice, precedents, customs, usages, historic example, &c., constant appeal to the maxims of policy prevalent in the assembly where the discussion is carried on, as well as an appropriate use of arguments tending to preserve the continuity of thought upon the topic receiving attention.

In this species of oratory there is need, in general, of a brief, expository exordium, showing how the public care is involved in the proper settlement of the subject; a fair statement of the several alternatives least liable to objection; with, occasionally, a criticism of those which appear most plausible; a detail of the compromises or concessions made towards a settlement by the advocates of the several modes of effecting a solution, so stated, as to lead to the mention of the manner of arranging the question at issue proposed by the speaker, and so reconciling the rival interests.

* Sir G. C. Lewis “On the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics,” vol. ii., p. 315.

This should be followed by a clear and circumstantial representation of the view proposed, and should be closed by a peroration, in which the several grounds for preference of each mode are disposed of, leading to and ending in the conclusion, that the suggestion made, as the result of the speaker's deliberation, is such as is free from the chief objections to which the others are exposed, and would yet procure the greater part of the advantages they aim at gaining. The management of the argument, and the tone of the speech, may each admit of latitude of manner; but the general tenor should be suitable to the breaking down of prejudices, the securing of concessions, the effecting of a conviction that the most salutary course has been pointed out, and ought, therefore, to be adopted.

IV. *Hortative*.—Hortative eloquence, in its highest rhetorical form, rises into harangue. Its aim is to incite, or stimulate, to encourage, and to spur on. It has a due place in the conduct of public business, when the speaker is proposing some new view, and is anxious to impress its importance on his hearers, when argument on the subject has been pretty equally matched, and there is need for bringing the feelings, affections, or passions into activity, and when a defeat has been sustained by the advocates of any measure. It must, of course, be stirring and lively; thought and emotion must work together in it, and the diction must be warm, vivid, and well placed. In the three previous species, rhetoric deployed its forces under the leadership of logic, and only, or at least chiefly subordinated the form of argument to the requirement of the time and circumstance; but now rhetoric takes the command of the passions, and employs logic as its auxiliary. The prompt, emphatic utterance of passion, and the heat and fervour of emotion, invigorate the hosts of the mind, and work them to the limits of their action. Yet, in all hortation, there is required a carefulness to avoid offence, a judiciousness, and a candour which prevents the agitation of the feelings from betrayal, and keeps within the scope of rational thought. In the advocacy of innovation, though glowing and intense, the language is conciliatory, and the utmost suavity of demeanour is maintained, because the production of a state of mind, favourable to the views advanced, is the aim of the speaker. He is hence constrained to cover many of his

most eager expressions with a tone of apology, and to utter many of his most keenly cherished wishes with modesty and hesitation, till he observes how the ideas take. When he notices that favour is accorded to them, he may then widen the sweep of his purpose, and give the reins to his enthusiasm; for, by so doing, he will most effectively ignite the passions of an audience, and spread the flame of his own intent. In importing into a closely-matched debate the eloquence of hortation, care must be taken to begin on the level of the debate, and to impress the House with a thorough confidence in the power of the speaker to discuss the question; to test now and again the temperature of passion in the hearers, and to discover in what form to administer the designed incitement. The topic suggested by the feeling of the audience should be employed earliest, and from these they should be hurried on to the desired consummation, by energy of mind imparting effectiveness to speech.

In hortation, after a defeat, greater art is requisite, and the spur must be inserted with vehemence and eagerness at the earliest moment, while the emotions are astir, and the excitement is uncooled. To utter then with vigour the words of hope, confidence, and undismayedness; to express persistency of purpose, along with manly submission; to point out the loopholes through which (if any) advantage had been taken, the strategies employed by opponents, and the surprises to which the speaker's party had been exposed; and so, from the height of passion, to calm and subdue the mind into present acquiescence, and yet excite a fixed determination for the future, is a great triumph of oratorical art. It ennobles defeat, and imparts a sense of manly endurance and worth, which prevents despair in one party, and checks overweening confidence in the other.

The exordium will, in general, give a reason for the excitement felt, and represent the feelings under which the speaker labours. There will then follow a denial of a feeling of personal or party injury, and a statement of the reasons which justify the inacquiescence displayed. The impelling motives for urging on the hearers the hortation employed, and the expression of a determination to be pursued in future, will form the chief grounds of the peroration. The style may be florid and figurative, but it must be intense

and eager. The elocution should be rapid and vigorous, and the pauses made should be so timed as to increase expectancy and whet the edge of passion.

V. *Invective*.—Hortation is the language of a friend to friends, which, though it may deal in reproof, proceeds from a sameness of interest, feeling, or conviction. Invective is the language of estrangement and enmity. It is reproachful, harsh, and accusing, always bitter, sometimes censorious, occasionally opprobrious. It, too, may reprove, but not with the design of producing any amendment. It reproves to condemn, and slurs that it may gratify rage. But it ought never to descend to railing, clamour, insolence, or malice. The honour of a name, a position, a party, or a person, may be assailed, and offence may be taken at the form which it assumes, or the matter in which it deals; but to preserve honour by dishonourable means is a paradox to which practical parliamentary life can lend no sanction. In terms however sharp-set invective may express itself, it must, if it would effect its purpose, avoid all merely irrelevant matter, and hold tenaciously to the purpose intended, whether that be to avenge a defeat, to embitter a rival's success, or to protect the honour of another, or of one's self. The vulnerable portion of an argument, a party, or an opponent's public life, must be that fixed on, and the attack should be direct, forthright,—specific in terms, and trenchantly earnest. The diction must be clear and sharp, vigorous and Saxonized; generalities must be avoided, and epigram and pungency may be employed with unrelaxing intensity, yet the style should be throughout plain, pointed, and precise.

The parts which such eloquence would naturally colligate and arrange for the attainment of the end in view should be an introduction, calculated not only to explain the growth of the feeling finding expression in the speech, but also to excite a similar one in the audience. The succeeding part should tend to increase that feeling, and intensify it. The cause of the speech ought to be noted and stated; the effects anticipated ought to be dwelt upon. The castigation may, therefore, be administered either in the form of a narrative of the procedures, exciting the speaker's ire, or justifying it; or in the form of advice regarding acts done, aims held, or professions made, which have not been accord-

ant with right or character, position or person. It may be couched in ironical praise, or may consist in an elaborate comparison of what might be, or ought to have been expected, with what has resulted from the steps taken by the party or persons inveighed against. The peroration should then consist of a collection of such excitements to the passions as shall induce the hearers to coincide with the speaker in his condemnation of the course objected to, and feel the justifiableness of the opposition offered to it.

VI. *Defensive*.—In public life accusations must be borne, opposition must be endured, and misunderstandings must frequently arise. Aggressions must be resisted, policy vindicated, and charges repelled. In no free country can men long retain the management of affairs in their hands without exposing themselves to grumbling misconception, opposition, censure, or active hostility. In this case defensive eloquence finds scope. It is the safeguard of the reputation of a public man. It ought to be terse and ready, and should never be begun

“With faltering speech and visage incomposed.”

The form should become statuesque, and the features receive animation; the words should be select, and the sentences brief and pointed. Every statement in opposition to the character of the person, or the advisability of a measure, ought to be distinctly met by an opposing fact or argument. The fallacy or irrelevancy of each argument should be clearly made out and exposed. Passion should be carefully suppressed, and serene temper, collected utterance, and logical thought, should rule the hour. A burst of indignation will occasionally flash from the soul in the ardour of excited thought, and give evidence of the emotion pulsing in the spirit; but it is often unsafe to display any such feeling,—it is so natural for men to obey the mandate, “Let the galled jade wince.” Defensive speech is much more potent when it seizes the weapon used against the measures or the man, and hurls it back at the opponent.

In defensive oratory it is advisable to notice how the matter has assumed the aspect it presents, to explain the turn the affair has taken, to repudiate the accusations made, and the personal or party insinuations expressed, to attack the opposition in return, and to submit to the judgment of

the House that the explanation offered affords sufficient justification. It may be requisite to demand an apology, but it is seldom that an affair of that sort can be successfully carried so far as to ensure a recantation.

The writer has hesitated to include, in the regular and justifiable styles of parliamentary eloquence, a class of speeches which, if he should believe the newspapers, often occupy the time of the Legislature, and sometimes attract the attention of the country. For want of a better and more characteristic designation he has been compelled to name it *formal or make-believe eloquence*. Such a form of speech is that employed by members who have nothing new or important to add to the sum of the knowledge of the House, and who speak chiefly for the gratification of the constituencies they represent, who do not wish to have a dumb representative. Some orators are accused of occupying the House through vain show; but we opine that such egregious vanity would soon receive quittance in our parliament, which is notoriously averse to being played upon. It may connive at a representative's humouring his constituents by making a speech of no interest or importance, merely that his name may be inserted in the newspapers as having spoken in the House; but it is unlikely to listen patiently to the mere effusions of vanity, if there be nothing in their matter or manner to commend them to its sense of fitness.

Make-believe speeches are most frequently done to order, that is, are got up in consequence of some movement made by the influential individuals in the member's party, or some threatening agitation amongst their opponents. As these speeches are only intended to answer an outside purpose, they are seldom of much importance, though they require a good deal of tact to make them tolerable. They most usually occur about the period of a new election, or on a subject which excites the constituency, while it does not affect the member's own mind. Such speeches require great care, in choosing a House in the right humour, and not over full; in selecting a topic capable of parliamentary treatment, yet calling for little debate, and therefore exposing the speaker to little danger of being "set down;" in adopting a brief and graceful form of speech, and in having it well prepared, as well as in giving it some especial

local application, such as may gratify the constituency represented. We attach little importance to this sort of essay-reciting in the legislative assemblies, and, therefore, have few observations to make on the management of it. The diction ought to be choice and gracefully collocated; the sentences should be neat, harmonious, and varied, and the whole should be brief, smart, tasteful, and pleasing. Such elocutional displays can only be enduring when well done, and when the House has nothing, or little else of importance to do. They ought to be infrequent and quiet.

We have thus outlined, as briefly as seemed consistent with the importance of our theme, the several classes into which parliamentary eloquence appears to be divisible. These distinct forms of oratory seldom occur pure and simple, but mingle and blend according to the mixed motives which actuate men. Still, a large proportion of the eloquence of Parliament will be found to display most prominently one or other of the forms of address which have been enumerated, and most of them will be found to illustrate the definitions and remarks made on them.

Of the various influences affecting the success of oratory, some, as we have said, are personal and others are circumstantial. As these are numerous, we must be brief in our notice of each, and only say so much as shall give the key to the reasoning which may prove each point.

The value and influence of *character* among men is very marked. It is the mark which we have made upon society by the whole course and tenor of our lives. He, therefore, who seeks to mould opinion, change the current of thought, guide the determinations of men, and urge them to decisions which affect the interests of many, and perhaps the destinies of nations, ought to be possessed of a social repute which would add weight to his address, and convince of the straightforward honour of the habits of his life and thought. Character depends, for the most part, on the possession of fixed principles firmly grasped and consistently pursued; of personal integrity and trustworthiness; of moderation in tone, temper, life, action, and transaction; of cautious and diligent attention to the duties of a station; of care in the selection of associates, and in the forming of intimacies; and of the upholding of a fearlessly consistent mode of life in daily habit and in public conference. Charac-

ter can rarely be put on as a varnish of life ; it ought to be the very result of the growth and manifestations of the life within working towards the outward and observable. Some men do indeed veneer their character for public show, and for a time succeed in attracting by brilliancy of polish and glossiness of surface ; but such a character cannot long undergo the tear and wear of public life before chip after chip is knocked off the corners of it, and a glimpse is got into the stuff that forms the inner substance. Revelations of this sort, when made, are usually of the most damaging tendency, for though it is a popular proverb with public men that "the people wish to be deceived, and therefore they are so," it is usually found by the detected deceiver to have been a dangerous experiment.

The man who in the long run is certain to win and keep an honourable place in political life, and in so far to make his public addresses powerful and effective, is one whose aims are noble ; whose principles are sound ; who seeks to accomplish his purposes by steady, patient, self-denying, enlightened, and undaunted perseverance ; who cannot be turned aside from the course he has laid before himself by love of ease, wealth, or popularity ; who knows no standard of judgment but truth and duty ; who acts from the decision of his own mind ; masters his passions and faculties so as to harmonize them with the resolves which animate him. Such a man carries within himself one of the paramount powers of eloquence—the power of mastery, control, conviction, influence. When a man is what he seems, and seems what he is, opportunity alone is wanting to make him a power among his fellows wheresoever his lot may be cast—if for good, great ; if for evil, lamentable. Hence the need of recognising *character* as an oratorical influence—an influence which, in direct address, makes itself powerfully and palpably felt, not only because it creates a presumption in favour of the opinions expressed, but because dependence can be placed in the honesty of that opinion.

The second point which affects the eloquence of a person in Parliament is the *position* he occupies there.

This, in a large measure, depends upon his character. Other accidental circumstances may vary the amount of influence exerted by character upon the personal position of a member of the legislature, such as official or hereditary

dignity, the state of parties, or the matter most agitating the country. These, however, are for the most part evanescent in their influence, while that is abiding.

Position is in most cases power. If, however, the position a man occupies is of his own making, or taking, or keeping, the respect attached to it and the influence it enables him to wield are much more decided than if chance gave it or intrigue gained it. In the House of Commons especially, the manner in which position has been attained or is retained, exerts a powerful effect on the reception given to a member's speech. A long, arduous, up-hill task it is to regain the favour of the House when once lost; and, indeed, it is not easy to gain its favour at all—unless position, wealth, gentlemanliness, talent, family influence, and electors' love lie greatly on one's side. Office will not confer dignity on a man whom the House contemns; nor will the want of it hinder a man from claiming the homage of the House if his position be such as to warrant him in demanding attention to his sayings and thinkings. Some forcible-feeblies acquire notoriety without position; but the man who is listened to in Parliament with most respect is, in general, the man best qualified by position, in regard to the matter under consideration, to speak with authority on the topic. Pretenders are nowhere so thoroughly and so coolly sacrificed as in the House of Commons; and hence a man had need to know and to keep his position in and while addressing that House.

"Government by *party*" is now a maxim in our politics; and few men enter the House unwed or unpledged by act or promise, by position, connection, or constituency, to one or other of the great divisions under which our members of Parliament range themselves. There is, therefore, necessarily a great difference in the acceptance given to a speech from a person known to be distinctly and out-and-out, as it is called, committed to any party. Seldom does the opposition, on whichever side it lies, receive it with perfect trust. Discount must be made of so much of the raciness, the heat, the rhetoric, as may justly be estimated to belong to the speaker as a partisan, even when the logic is admittedly right; but even that is often exposed to doubt, and the *suppressio veri* is diligently looked for, or the *ignoratio elenchi* is carefully sought out; for few men can believe in

the honesty of an opponent, and they are the less willing to do so when they imagine interest to operate in the mind of the hearer. Party is simply that class of men with whom your interest seems most nearly linked, and by whom you think you would be (or are) best served. To be a partizan is, therefore, however necessary in government, a great obstruction to the attainment of the character of a great orator. At the same time it must be admitted that it often affords topics for declamation, and opportunities for skilful fence and stinging invective, for ready wit and trenchant irony.

One main object of oratory is to overcome resistance. Persuasion is the urging of views upon others as more advisable, proper, excellent, or advantageous than those with which they are (or seem) inclined to rest satisfied—that is, to lessen and at last to bear down opposition. In so far, then, as the necessity of the times compels a member of Parliament really or supposedly to belong to a party, it forms an obstacle to that free, forth-going power from which persuasion results; while if a man does not ostensibly adhere to any party, he is more likely to be looked upon with a suspicious watchfulness to see to which side he inclines, and a continual doubt insinuates itself into the hearers' minds regarding the honest and forthright intent of his advocacy. Parliamentary consistency almost necessitates partisanship; duty to a constituency, which is generally much mixed, most frequently counsels an impartial support of good measures. Hence the traditions and customs of Parliament place a direct obstacle in the way of eloquence, and almost compel members "to give up to party what was meant for mankind." The party speaker can seldom compass the higher triumphs of oratory; for these require the great, broad, regardless sweep of truth, not the careful scythe-dodging of policy.

Representation, though it fables the equality of each member of the respective Houses of Parliament, can never accomplish that end fully. The associative faculty is persistent in its activity, and continually recalls the character of the *constituency* of which the speaker is a representative, and insensibly adds force or ascribes weakness to the advocacy of the several points adduced, according as that constituency, from the general tenor of its sentiments, confirms or diminishes the worth of the member's observations.

Nay, the knowledge that one speaks for a large, powerful, intelligent, politically organized, and consenting constituency, forms an element of power itself, which sometimes stirs the soul to oratory, of which it would otherwise be incapable ; and the consciousness that one advocates a cause in which a constituency is lukewarm, or speaks for a constituency either so insignificant in numbers or in independence of thought and action as to hamper the tongue with shame, dulls the very thought, and impedes the working of the whole machinery of effective—because earnest and unhesitant—eloquence. This effect is operative both on hearer and speaker, and forms another difficulty in the way of the aspirant after fame in modern oratory. Similarly, in the House of Lords, the wealth, the influence, the public repute, the neighbourly regard in which a nobleman is held, affects the acceptance of his oratory by his peers, and operates upon his own mind while addressing them.

Almost every man who engages earnestly and continuously in any class of pursuits acquires a liking for some special department, gains a reputation in that, and begins to be regarded as an authority upon that *speciality*. From position, opportunity, inducement, or need, almost every person becomes better conversant with particular facts, processes, topics, studies, departments in life, &c., than most others, and hence receives deference and attention when he gives his opinion upon that. We see this illustrated in every-day life, in every village, in every workshop, even. We should not wonder, therefore, that in the Parliament there are men noted for specialities, whose voice on these topics is always one of power, and whose words on these subjects outweigh the mere extempore utterances of those who have not acquired a similar repute. This is in many senses a highly beneficial influence ; but it acts most damagingly upon eloquence in several ways—as, for instance, in putting the speaker under the necessity of keeping within the strictest proveable mark ; in inclining the hearers to acquiescence independently of conviction ; in restraining men from the study and consideration of those questions for themselves on which there is a reasonable probability of getting an authoritative opinion. Hence we see matters of finance, law, morals, commercial treaties, &c., fall into the hands of cliques in debate, and find legislation accomplished more

from the assurance of a few that it is requisite and wholesome, than from the general conviction of the House that it is right and well considered. Hence, too, the determined count-outs by which the advocate of a measure can be forthcast, and the readiness with which the House yields under an agitation cleverly got up by the representative man of some speciality. This introduction of the division of labour into Parliament, inasmuch as it lessens the need for general intelligence and thoughtfulness among the representatives, is inimical to modern eloquence.

All these drawbacks influence the eloquence of the times by placing the speaker in a position wherein orations are composed, delivered, and heard under the influence of adventitious circumstances. The speaker is hampered by their pressure ; the outgo of his mind is restrained by them. Instead of speaking out the forthright truth, policy, temporizing, qualification, finessing are resorted to, and the free, frank, simple, unaffected activity of the mind is made impossible. Every idea, feeling, or influence, except the one prime mind-moving thought which determines to speech, should be kept sedulously out of the mind. Only by keeping that firmly in the centre of vision, by bending all the force of mind towards the comprehension, exposition, and enforcement of that, can we throw it out of ourselves in an overmastering and irresistible fitness for accomplishing its purpose. All these influences, as elements of disturbance to the thoughts, require to be thrown aside or buffeted down before the whole energy of the soul can be poured forth in deliberate address with that consummate art and tact which hits the very aim, produces the very effect, to which the predetermination of the speaker was directed.

The greater the number of disturbing forces which modify the purpose or practice of the speaker, the more difficult is it to attain success. To prepare the separate threads of thought which are to form the warp, to arrange those which are to make up the woof ; to determine on the pattern and to go on weaving them all into an instantaneously increasing whole, in the very presence of critical spectators, is a labour of much difficulty in itself ; when, however, the thoughts to be chosen for either purpose and part are to be subjected to scrutiny before use, not in reference to their use, but their acceptability ; when the pattern requires to

be arranged to fit, not the taste and skill of the designer and worker only, but of the onlooker or overlooker also; and when the work in every moment of its course must retain its continuousness and its adaptation to its end in the midst of innumerable elements of disturbance and disarray, and must, in some fashion, change and adapt itself to the sudden exigencies of the moment, the difficulty is incalculably increased.

The *circumstances* under which parliamentary oratory is employed constitute another set of important disturbing influences, from submission to which there is no possible dispensation. The *intra-parliamentary* management of the fluent motion of the tongue is sometimes excessively difficult. Reserve is here, in many cases, if not a virtue, a policy or a necessity. While matters are under *diplomatic* negotiation, it would often precipitate action, sometimes produce great calamity, and not unfrequently interrupt the relations of governments, if the ready tongue should indiscreetly mouth out the several intents of states, purposes of preparations, and plans of operation and co-operation, of retrenchment or of reinforcement, of change or legislation. So, again, an *administration* is constantly exposed to danger from the cautionlessness of the ready speaker, who reveals secrets before due preparation has been made, or matters are put in a fit state to be told. The ramifications of influence are so manifold, that secretiveness has become an indispensable portion of the qualifications for holding office, and overvolubility of tongue is to be carefully eschewed. Again, *party tactics* are now so complicated, and the opposing forces are so much on the alert, that the careless utterance of an untimely hint may undo the deep-laid schemes of wisely plotting minds for months together, and give a long delay to hopes and aspirations.

The *aims*, whether of individuals or parties, require sometimes covert, sometimes open action; and as this or that is the case, so will also be the need for circumspect attention to the forms of speech employed to ensure their success.

The *feelings* of members, whether held regarding persons or parties, must largely influence public discourse. Feeling is at the root of all earnestness; but the speaker must either harmonize his own feeling with those of his audience, or bring his audience over to feel as he does. Feeling, how-

ever, in parliamentary assemblies is a difficult matter to get a thermometer for, and is hence a great practical enigma. Personality must be avoided, and personal interests must be held aloof; and yet few or none can avoid personal references, or resist personal interest. The adroit management of the House on these points assumes every day a character of greater difficulty.

The *occasion* of an oration requires to be carefully weighed. Sometimes the opposition, knowing the imminence of some topic, hurry an orator into rash delivery of his sentiments by affording an occasion on which a speech will be fruitless, and hence may defeat the aim. Or the speaker may misjudge the seasonability of bringing up the question he purposes to discuss, and thereby injure the very heart's wish of his friends or his party, or the espousers of the cause on which he spoke. Either the temper of the House is unfit, or a more important matter lies before it, or the time is inappropriate, or the right men are not in their places, or a muster of the wrong men has been got up, or a side wind from an adverse speaker or a rash friend destroys the opportunity of effectively dealing with the matter proposed. All these elements require nice and cautious management, and call for acute and ready tact and good sense.

Class interests, again, are very numerous and very urgent, and representatives for most of them are always watchfully active. A polite warfare may be said to be almost continually going on among them; and a keen outlook is kept by each, not only for grievances on their side, but aggressions from others. Here, again, there arise complications difficult of unravelment, and exigencies when skill and *savoir-faire* are requisite. These matters affect eloquence within the precincts and in the moments of activity in the House. There are, however, *extra-parliamentary* influences which make themselves felt in the oncarrying of business, and therefore in the expression of opinion on the points involved in the discussions which arise regarding it. To these the parliamentary orator must always be sensitive, and of them he must always be sensible. Popularity and the effectiveness which result from it are easily lost, and the public is usually very unforgiving to a discarded favourite. Its memory of past services is short, unless prompted by the hope of future benefits. Of these, perhaps, the first and

most important is *public opinion*,—that resistless tide of thought which rises and bellows and swelters about statesmen, and keeps continually sweeping around them,—which agitates society and stirs clubs, associations, constituencies, mobs, and sometimes makes them masterful ; yet in its flux and reflux is so often lawless, inexplicable, and changeful. By this the statesman's oratory must be in part affected, and to take his position rightly in regard to it is frequently most distracting and painful. In a less degree, but much in the same way, though with closer and more individual intensity, the *feeling of a constituency* operates. Sometimes a good deal of *finesse*, reserve, and discretion—we shall not say cunning—are required to bring the speaker's expressions into right relations with the time and action of the day.

Almost, to some minds, a graver difficulty than either of these is felt in the *liability to criticism* which affects all public men. Skilled criticism has of late been so sedulously sharpened to its work, so much pains have been expended on the polishing of its scalpels and the poisoning of its tests, that few can escape the trial to which it calls each aspirant to honour, and the inquisition to which it subjects every activity exerted in the public service, often probing even the very privacies and the sanctities of home, heart, and life—family, fortune, fame, and welfare. To this the orator is of course peculiarly exposed, and, as the record of his utterances can always be referred to, the public expression of opinion is not unmixed with need for care. To this liability to criticism *the state of parties outside of Parliament* often gives intensity, and forms an enmeshment of the energies exercised in eloquence of most damaging completeness. Only a vigorous genius, a perfect master of the whole science and practice of the electricity of thought, can in such circumstances clear off from himself the impending environments, and give voice to the purpose of his soul.

The imminence of an election has often an effect on the quantity and quality of eloquence in the House. Then all the previous elements receive intenser development. Then the pressure both of personal and circumstantial influences makes itself more and more felt, and the hemming in of the faculties coincident with the overstrain of the need for speech, places the legislator in an awkward fix. *The noble, dutiful English mind*, however, generally rises in

force as the difficulties of any task increase, and the dying strains of a closing session are often bolder, and grander, and more massive—in short, more eloquent, than at any other time.

We have attempted to explain the difficulties of parliamentary oratory for the information of the public. That parliamentary utterances exist at all among us must amaze those who reflect upon the matters we have pointed out ; and the people who most thoroughly comprehend the difficulties to be overcome in the achievement of a speech of national interest, will more highly prize the fame of those great minds who rule the destinies of men and nations by their efforts in parliamentary eloquence.

CHAPTER IV.

FORENSIC ELOQUENCE.

FORENSIC Eloquence is annually the arbiter of the joy or sorrow of multitudes. Its effects are felt in almost every phase and form of social life. The power of suasion which it exerts, affects daily the privileges, rights, reputation, property, liberty, or life of many. Justice every day dispenses her awards, and Law gives forth her mandates, practically, at the suggestion, instigation, or prompting of legal pleaders ; whose skilful expositions, cogent statements, earnest appeals, and eager, passionate, or ingenious advocacy, touch the nicely poised balances, and give them that decisive inclination or turn to which the occupants of our judicial benches are so attentive and sensitive. To know the true worth, use, and method of this energy so subtly intertextured with all the concerns of existence, to estimate its quality, and to acquire a little information regarding its rules and processes, seem likely to be of some interest to general readers ; while an exposition of the main principles, on which successful pleading depends, may not only gratify a legitimate curiosity regarding one of the most common yet singular phenomena of life, but may also supply instruction to those who wish to use this potent influence for professional purposes. All readers are now, more or less, accustomed to peruse the chief efforts of

forensic debaters ; and many constitute themselves critics of the sweeping rhetoric, or the trenchant dialectics they display. It may, therefore, be conducive to educative efficacy to have a brief, reasoned-out view of the pleader's art, *i.e.*, forensic eloquence, presented ; and it may not be altogether valueless to learn the philosophic principles which underlie and form the foundations of those splendid efforts by which the great pleaders have acquired their fame—efforts too frequently supposed to be the results of a happy knack, or a rare sagacity ; and too seldom attributed to their true cause, a diligent and careful employment of all the mental capacities upon the matters of fact, thought, evidence, or argument which cases yield.

The art of advocacy is not attained by inspiration ; nor are its honours gained by some rare chance or "lucky hit." The secret of forensic success is the world-old one—thoughtful industry applied to the management of the veriest trifle connected with the accomplishment of the main design.

A persistent course of patient, long-continued, and severe mental discipline is necessary to the formation of the legal character. The mind must be inured to labour, and habituated to activity. It must be able to employ the whole armoury of its acquirements without pedantry, and free from display. A sort of instantaneity of logical thought and rhetorical speech must be industriously attained ; and the power of tracing out a thought to all its possible conclusions must be so trained and practised as to become at last as much to be relied on as the activity and sagacity of an instinct. Mere learning, observation, or reflection will not accomplish it. Practice, effort, and industry, as well as sedulous, severe, and solitary study, are required. Of the genuine forensic mind it may be truly said :—

"All things within it
Are so digested, fitted, and composed,
As it shows Wit had married Order."

Forensic skill is not forensic eloquence. These often exist apart. A natural ingenuity of mind, assiduously subjected to careful culture, when employed in the conducting of a case involving great principles, or possessed of intrinsic elements of interest, may often display forensic *skill*, and even simulate, or—let us say—achieve forensic

eloquence. But this depends much more upon the case than upon the pleader. Less interesting contests as to property or rights, though they might be carried on with as profound an insight into the principles of jurisprudence, and elicit as masterly a statement of the applicability of the statutes or precedents implied in the trial, would yet fall flat and unimpressively upon the minds addressed, compared to the manner in which they would affect them, if the advocate could add the arts of persuasion to those of conviction, and could reinforce the issues of his skill with the products of his eloquence.

To think decidedly and to speak clearly ; to know the requirements of courts and the forms of process ; to possess as much self-confidence as to plead without embarrassment, yet to be so free from self-conceit as to avoid offence ; to have read with diligence a multitude of acts of parliament, the digests of legists, the decisions of judges, abstracts of cases, and specifications of styles ; to have matured a habit of distinct definition ; and to have settled into categories the various possibilities of civil, criminal, or other law—important as these are—will not succeed in eliciting the compliment due to distinguished forensic ability :—

“Persuasion tips his tongue whene’er he talks.”

There is another set of studies to be mastered before the thrill of oratory can be employed to animate emotion, give effect to deft argument, and invincibility to intellectual force. To artistic precision of style, to perspicuity of thinking, to emphatic pertinence of argument, to thorough knowledge of law and acquiescence in its forms, there must be added the power of touching truth with the colours of imagination, of applying inducements to the will, and of stirring the sensitive feelings of the hearer.

We do not depreciate skill in comparison with eloquence. We appreciate it as essential and indispensable. We do not suggest the lessening of skill ; we only advocate the addition of another element of skill to that already impliedly attained. Forensic eloquence is confessedly not always a concomitant of forensic ability, and our best pleaders in law are not unfrequently our worst pleaders by speech. This does not result from any incompatibility between the possession of sound legal knowledge and ready facility in

expression. It arises, more generally, from contempt for eloquence, as a subsidiary art, as a showy and fantastic acquisition, a simulating trickery, and an adventitious element in legal advocacy. This, we apprehend, is a misconception. Pleading is speech. Speech has its laws and forms, its graces and peculiarities, its processes and technicalities. If the instrument must be employed, the art of using it should be learned. Speech has been the subject of scientific culture. Its principles have been discovered, and their applicability has been tested.

Forensic eloquence is an adaptation of the principles and laws of persuasive eloquence to the production, or at least the furtherance, of effective and successful advocacy in courts of law, in so far as such advocacy is regarded as having persuasion for its given purpose, and speech for the instrument employed in persuasion. The details of this secondary art depend upon certain subsidiary elements ; as, for example, the nature of law and the constitution of its courts, in so far as they allow and provide for the exercise and employment of persuasion, the protection afforded to pleaders in the conducting of suits, the publicity or privacy in which the advocate conducts his case, &c. But the chief fundamental principles, maxims, and rules of the art are drawn from the purpose had in view in the institution of professional pleaders in the courts of law, and the duties which may be considered as incumbent upon such pleaders in their conjoint relationship to the law, and to the actual or possible clients in whose behalf they may appear in court.

Law is the guardian of civil society. It defines the rights, and determines the obligations of men. The safety and good order of every community depend on the majesty and magistracy of the law. Law is the deliberate expression of the highest conception of duty to which a nation has attained. It prescribes the limits of individual activity, and sets bounds to the need of personal endurance. It marks and enforces the distinction between just and unjust ; and, accepting the ethical ideas of right and wrong as silent, but tangible powers among men, it establishes an order in their relationships which shall be at once availing and prevailing ; for the enforcement and preservation of which it decrees an order of sequence between any transgression of

the requirements of civil life, and the exaction or infliction of the penalties attached to each infringement.

Religion educates and exercises the conscience, morality regulates the will, and law governs the conduct or actions of men. Law is the word in which we sum up and name the whole of those dictates, to which communities consentingly submit, regarding right and wrong as these are expressed in the statutes and ordinances of the Government, interpreted in harmony with the history, manners, life, and religion of the people, the rules of right reason, and the current of public opinion. All decrees having the force of law must, of course, be fixed in accordance with the usual forms of legislation, be promulgated in a fair and open manner, be expressed in an explicit style, and have a clearly defined purpose. If they are enforceable by pains or penalties, these should be inflicted or exacted only on due proof of violation made before competent and properly constituted tribunals, sitting in formal official activity, and exercising their prescribed functions in the usual manner, and for their assigned purpose, *i.e.*, in "fair and open court."

Law has now become so pervasive as to affect all civil society, and to exert an influence upon each individual. The pertinence, applicability, and incidence of law interest all men, and few cases arise in which the question can be found so isolated as to affect no other matter than that involved in its own settlement. Society has a direct practical stake in almost every law suit, in the issues it raises, the arguments by which it is enforced or opposed, as well as in the decision, to which it furnishes the occasion; and hence it finds it useful to arrange the activities of its members, so that some may engage themselves as middle men between the law and the individuals of whom it is composed. To these the culture of forensic eloquence is left, and the critical consideration of the incidence of law on life is wisely mapped out as a special province of human endeavour.

Laws may be either declaratory, directory, remedial, or prohibitive. The first class is expository, and its object is to instruct the subject regarding the requirements of the State in respect to specific actions or kinds of actions. The second class is prescriptive. It limits or extends the boundaries by which civil society encircles the free activity of the individuals who form its constituents. The third

class provides against injuries, inconveniences, or wrongs, so far as they are preventible, by withdrawing restrictions on, or removing obstacles to, the free course and operation of justice and order. The fourth class forbids the omission of the duties of men as members of a civic union, or the commission of any (avoidable) injury to the persons composing the social confederation. This restrictive, evil hindering species of law is generally accompanied by some privative or vindicative provision, by the application of which observance of it is enforced. Indeed to all laws, more or less, the sanction of pains and penalties is attached, so that either by the deprivation of right, or by the infliction of retributory or reformatory suffering, on purse or person, obedience may be secured. Laws may be otherwise regarded as civil or criminal. Civil law provides for the defence of right and the redress of wrong, by the enforcement of restitution or compensation in actions or transactions between subject and subject. Criminal law brings under the punitive power of the State all persons charged with breach of duty, or violation of right, in matters which are regarded as public injuries; that, on due inquisition being made, if the guilt charged on the alleged offender is proved, he may be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of the statutes infringed. Many other subdivisions of law are also commonly spoken of: *e.g.*, ecclesiastical, military, commercial, marine, &c., &c., all of which are reducible to the general definition, that they constitute a body of fixed rules for the procuring and securing of the rights and privileges of the obedient and deserving, and for the arrestment and suppression of offences, by the degradation or punishment of transgressors. All of them suppose and imply a generally acquiesced in standard of right, to which submission is proper, and insubordination wrong.

Seeing that human life is so embraced and permeated by law, and that the complex relationships of men demand the continued arbitrement of judicial decisions on so many points of practical activity, the expediency of the institution of forensic pleading has been, as we have said, generally acquiesced in as an advisable, if not an essential, subdivision of civic activity; and hence, of course, has arisen the need for a specific sort of eloquence—an oratory in which law, *logic, and life should obtain united representation, be har-*

monized together, and be shown to be mutually effective in the maintenance of the right, the good, and the true. This is the eloquence which in addresses to juries, in arguments before judges, in speeches to parliamentary commissions, or the loftiest courts of human appeal—such as the House of Lords,—vindicates at once the majesty of justice and the rights of man; invokes the retribution, or supplicates the leniency of society; brings under the protection of the State the innocent and unoffending, or tears from the pride of place and power the transgressor against the interests, the policy, or the institutions of civil society.

Forensic oratory has laws and principles of its own. Of these we must form correct estimates before we can thoroughly comprehend the necessity for constructing a special rhetoric for use at the bar, or appreciate the peculiar requirements of judicial oratory. Popular parliamentary or pulpit eloquence is either presentative or representative, either enlarges upon and explains some thought which stirs the speaker's mind, or states and demonstrates the ideas entertained by large bodies of people. The pleader does not appear in court to express his own independently formed convictions, nor does he even appear as the mouthpiece and retailer of the wishes of his client. He is neither entirely a representative, nor wholly a substitute. He takes his professional place as a sort of compound personality. He attends, it is true, to say, do, quirk, and tack about, with every faculty of his mind, as his client would be entitled to do if able; but he also appears as counsel for his client, with responsibilities, as such, to the court, his profession, the law, and public opinion, as well as to the person in whose behalf he appears as advocate. He is not a mere trader in legal learning, or vendor of technical casuistries, but a gentleman whose professional status is regarded as a guarantee for the due and proper conduct of any given case for the interests of his client as far as the law allows. The conditions, therefore, under which he acts constitute so many overruling elements influencing eloquence in such a way as to make forensic oratory often a very intricate and embarrassing procedure.

In forensic eloquence the living energy of thinking is constrained, and the pressure of an outward and imposed influence affects its activity, and modifies its direct, forth-

working impartiality, as well as its natural inductiveness. In the common exercises of oratory the pathway of thought is free. In law it is far otherwise; statutes, customs, judiciary rules, precedents, and technicalities, oppose or hinder progress, cause divergencies, or make a circuit advisable or requisite. The disputations form, too, in which the whole thought must be cast, and the need for leaving as few loopholes of vantage to an opponent as possible, give rise to other peculiar characteristics of forensic thought. Forensic oratory is, for the most part, engaged in under the consciousness of criticism, from the sedate and stern occupant of the judgment-seat, often from the practical, common-sense gentlemen of the jury, always from the opposing agent, and frequently from a multitude of professional brethren; and we shall have made out clearly that considerable differences exist between forensic and popular oratory.

These specialities must have made themselves apparent to any one who has watched the process of a trial in any of the courts of law or justice. They have seen the presiding judge or judges with moveless equanimity listening to the statements and harangues of the costumed pleaders, who seemed with all the dexterity of perfect adepts to unravel the mysteries of a case, and to the subsequent contest of points of law or fact between the antagonist counsellors; they have noticed the impanelled jury watching the turning of the topics, and the enforcement of the pleas of the respective advocates, and seen their countenances change, and their attent eyes waver when the close quibbling of the expositors of the respective cases was going on; they have seen the members of the bar ingeniously examining the various "moves" of the engaged pleaders, and observed the effects which each exertion of skill had upon those men themselves accustomed to the active play of mind against mind.

Hedged in by statute and precedent, prescription and form; by positive morality and professional etiquette; by clients' clamour and critics' inquisitions; by public policy and personal status; by legal process, and by social requirements, forensic oratory is no mere juggle of shuffling trickery or grotesque parade of lacquered hypocrisy as it is often thought to be (and sometimes, let it be confessed, becomes),

but a needful and requisite agency for the proper oncarrying of human affairs, demanding specific preparation, and necessitating a style of speech suitable to the fashions and exigencies under which it is practised.

The forensic orator does not appear in courts of law as the proxy or personator of the client for whom he acts; nor does he come entitled to speak out quite as fully and freely as his client would have done had he been permitted and able to plead his own cause. The art of pleading is mediatorial and interpretative,—not substitutionary or representative. Two clients, in a civil case, have cause of disagreement, and the law, desirous of securing impartiality, insists on impersonality. It therefore provides that those labouring under the animosities, excitements, and interests of a suit shall not appear with all the disturbing tendencies of passion in its sedate tribunals, but shall send diplomatic deputies before her to state the case; not as it shows itself in the distorting mirror of the impassioned litigants, but as it manifestly exhibits itself in the presence of the statute book and its interpreter. These representatives of the opposing interests come into court as men accreditedly conversant with the state of the law on the given matter; as men who have considered the case in the points of view on which a decision on either side is demanded; as having formed in their minds a positive idea of the relationship existing between the claims of their respective clients and the provisions of statutory justice in the matter under dispute or on trial in debate.

The merely personal interests of the clients, however impassioning to themselves, are here nominally laid aside in deference to the supremacy of the Law, which is acknowledged by the institution of the suit and the commissioning of ambassadors in their respective interests. These intermediaries—the pleaders—accept the law as umpire, and bring their interpretation of the doctrines of justice before her ministers; their character, reputation, and respectability, as practitioners of the law, are staked on the applicability of their statements of the case to the requirements of the law, and on the placing of the case before the court in an adjudicable point of view. They are accepted by the clients, on the one hand, as sufficiently competent to “state their case,” and by the court as

sufficiently competent to "state the law," and their work is to convince and persuade the representative of the law that the conclusions drawn from or regarding these two statements are legitimate. Differences may arise between the advocates, either on the statements of the case,—in fact, or form, or dependence; or the statement of the law,—in definition, category, or applicability; or in the concilience of each to the conclusion sought to be deduced, and debate ensues,—each labouring to secure the admission of his claim or objection by the supreme functionary in the court where the cause is laid.

Here the idea of cliency is, to a great extent, laid aside, and lawyerly ability, skill, and power come into play, and the case, in some sort, ceases to be a contest of clients, and to merge into a *duello* of advocates, each desirous to overtop the other by superiority of legal dexterity, acquisition, or exposition. The judge lays aside from his mind the personalities involved; regards the statements and the pleas; considers the intent and applicability of the statute, or other ground of judgment; and gives a decision determined by the evidence of the case as brought before him, and duly sifted by debate; by the expositions of the law founded on in the pleadings, and by their relevancy as premises and conclusions. The pleader's place, therefore, is not so much that of the substitute or representative of a client as of mediator between the law and his client, and interpreter of his client's case in its relation to law, and of the law in its applicability to that case.

So long as the debate depends on mere questions of law, and the facts are undisputed or indisputable; and so long as the question concerns merely the persons contending, the Law Courts deal with the case as mere law, and determine accordingly; but if the case be one in which society is directly and specially interested, provision is made for the representation of society by a jury, whose duty it is to judge of the fact, leaving to the judge the application of the law. Here the mediatorial character of the advocate appears perhaps more palpably. The advocates on such occasions address themselves to statements calculated to show the effect on society of the matter under inquiry, and so to shape the question as to involve some prevalent *passion*, or feeling, or mood. They place the case before

the jury, not as the hot, exasperated client would do, but as their professional tact admonishes them, in the way which will best conciliate to their statement the minds of the occupants of the jury-box. Their statements of law do not, then, take the pure and simple form they assume before a judge sole. The law is so expounded as to show its effects on a given (undesirable in the pleader's side of the case) verdict of the jury; and hence, to counterbalance the prejudicial form which such statements take for the biasing of the mind, the judge recalls, or modifies, the expositions given by the pleaders, or re-explains the law to the jury; defines their province and their duty, and clearly marks off what is left for him to perform.

Similarly, even in criminal cases, the mediatorial character of the advocate appears; though in such cases complicated by the provision made, in this country, for the security of the subject,—that no one is bound to criminate himself. Here, the (supposed) criminal's advocate, accepting the plea of his client, requires to become the interpreter of his case, as the ground has been laid for him by that plea, and the opposing counsel for the prosecution is bound also to start from the same platform of allowed plea. In the one statement (that made by the latter) all the elements suggestive of guilt on the part of the accused are collected, arranged, and exposed, and in this way he, as the advocate of society against the alleged criminal, gives his interpretation of the offence, and claims the protective interposition of the law for society against the criminal. The advocate for the prisoner requires to rebut the evidence brought forward, to show the inapplicability of the statement of the prosecution to interpret the case of the non-delinquent (according to his recorded plea), and to solicit the shield of the law for the accused, and protection not only to him, but to others who might be similarly placed, from the operation of the vindictive sanctions of civil life.

A greater sense of personality suffuses the criminal than the civil courts, and hence the zealous advocate sometimes oversteps the mediatorial, and assumes the representative form of pleading; but that our view is even here substantiated we deduce from the fact, that many possibilities of mediatorship are reposed in the pleader even after the jury has determined a criminal's guilt, in motions for arrest of

judgment or delay of sentence ; in pleas for mercy, or statements of reasons why sentence should not be pronounced ; on a fair exposition of which "the mercy of the law" may be extended, if it do not interfere with the constitution or the interests of society.

These might take various arrangements, but, perhaps, that suggested in the following table may afford the simplest and readiest practical form of exposition, viz.,—

Outline of the Elements of Forensic Eloquence.

Forensic Eloquence as affecting	1. The Client	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Clear statement of the case. 2. Plain exposition of the law. 3. Mention of causes and results. 4. Appeal in favour.
	2. The Judge	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Categorical definition. 2. Careful induction of precedents. 3. Concise statement of statutes, &c., relied on. 4. Logical consistency of argument. 5. Explanation of the tendencies and issues of judgments sought. 6. Appeal to the majesty and morality of the law.
	3. The Jury (if any)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Effective narration. 2. Popular statement of the worth of evidence (controversially). 3. Cogency of application. 4. Appeal on the expediency of the law.
	4. Opposing pleaders	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lucid exposition. 2. Rapid conception in debate. 3. Able cross-questioning. 4. Ready retaliativeness and retort. 5. Professional appeal.
	5. Public opinion	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Careful and honest details. 2. Morality of the theory of law. 3. Effects on social life. 4. Quotation of popular maxims. 5. Personal considerations. 6. Claim to amendment of law, or revision of decision.

The theory of forensic eloquence is of great preliminary importance in any modern exposition of a science of the oratory of the bar. It has been usual, heretofore, in works on rhetoric, to adhere to the ancient divisions of forensic eloquence, and to regard it as confined chiefly to the affecting of the understanding, and therefore, as concerning itself

in the main with fluency and distinctness of narrative, and cogency, and logicity of argument. This scheme of rhetoric ill adapts itself to modern usages and methods, founded as it is on the practices of legal pleaders, whose courts were very differently constituted from ours. It limits far too narrowly the possible oratory of the bar. In fact, it leaves completely unnoticed some of the most specific points in which the modern art of advocacy differs from that of Greece, Rome, and the middle ages, and is so far defective as an expository science. The theory here proposed includes, as component elements of the eloquence of the bar, all needful arts of assuaging anger, tempering severity, producing leniency of judgment, or governing the passions by persuasion, and requires remarks in explanation of several matters not now included amongst the studies of professional pleaders during the course of their (legal) education.

The eloquence of the bar includes the speeches of advocates, the charges of recorders, and the summaries of judges. Law has now grown into a vast and powerful entity, whose influence and whose officers are everywhere; whose halls are open to all comers; and whose administrators are bound to afford audience to every one claiming her aid or protection. This universal presence of law in our midst, with her strict statutes, gives it a magisteriality before which men's passions in general quail; and when they come, or are brought, into the courts, they come into its presence hesitantly and shy, anxious to conciliate it, and looking upon it as something to be moved, yet not easy to be won. This gives the form of mediatorship to forensic eloquence. In most cases the eloquence of the bar assumes a controversial tone,—those who employ it deferring to law as umpire, but sedulous to turn the fairest aspect of their case to the scrutiny of the judge. Hence, the forensic orator requires, in most cases, to keep a double purpose constantly before his mind, viz.,—1st, the establishment of *his* case by all the means the law allows, and all the proofs the matter under consideration affords. 2nd. The refutation of the case of the opposing counsel by any legal means, or by the use of any feasible and available retort or argument which the matter or method of the suit supplies.

That these functions of the advocate may be effectively

performed, there are three matters to which the powers of his mind must be applied, viz., 1st. The attainment of a complete knowledge of the facts of the question in dependence, and the objects in view in bringing it before the court. 2nd. The proper arrangement of these facts in their relations to the law and to the case of the opposing party, so as best to effect the given object. 3rd. The effective expression of them in speech, so as at once to state the case for the client to the judge or jury, against the opposition, with due regard to public decorum, and in accordance with the kind and amount of evidence able to be brought forward in support of the position taken.

The pleader's object is to gain his case; like every orator, his business is to persuade, and so to win "the hearts of all that he may angle for," that they shall consent to the rightness, if not the righteousness, of his claim or his defence. Persuasion depends upon the proper employment and presentment of proofs, the manner in which these are set forth, and the method and keenness with which they touch some passions or emotions, active or excitable in the hearts of those whom he addresses.

Logic, of course, teaches, as a practical art, the methods of forming, employing, and criticizing arguments; and the adept in its processes soon acquires a readiness in bringing from its repertories such help as it may yield. These, after arrangement by rhetoric, become topics, of which, as regards forensic eloquence, there are two sorts, viz., *internal*, self-contained in the subject itself; *external*, or lying beyond, yet attached or related to the subject. Proof depends upon the right use and proper arrangement of the several topics which a suit supplies, and the ability of the orator is displayed in the gathering together of these, in the arrangement of them so as to help each other and his case, and in the pointedness with which he brings them, in their aggregated force, to bear upon matters in dispute or under consideration, in their relations to his client, to the opposers of his case, and to the law.*

* A "Synopsis of the Principles of Proof" is given in Neil's "Elements of Rhetoric," p. 216, in which book also there are two chapters on Method (22 and 23), which, with two in "The Art of Reasoning" (19 and 20), afford a complete view of the subject in its double relation *to thought and expression*.

"The logic of evidence," which is involved, either directly or indirectly, in every act and effort of life, is brought prominently before the intellect in an especial manner in every appeal to law. The capacity of fixing in one's mind all that lies within the sphere of a case available for expounding it properly, and of determining readily the relations any suit bears at once to the facts on which it is founded, and the law to which it is about to be referred, is one of supreme importance in an advocate. It falls, therefore, to the forensic orator to hold firmly by the method best calculated to effect his purpose, and never to lose sight of the tendency of every form of speech to affect the ultimate aim of his pleading. Whether, therefore, he narrates or interrogates, doubts or takes for granted, quotes, apologizes, or denies, infers or conjectures, ridicules or panegyricizes, speaks plainly or involves the subject in the mists of figurative expression, reproaches or moralizes, affects to defer to principle or attempts to establish an exception, dilates or recapitulates, relinquishes or reclaims, admits or retracts, speaks perspicuously or diffusely, appeals to natural morality or legal right, adopts dramatically the character of his client or separates himself from the person whose brief he holds, and addresses the bench [or the jury] as a responsible member of society, he must have before him a full and clear view of the case he intends to present, and must preserve such a oneness of effect throughout all this diversity of means and matter as shall leave no observable loopholes of vantage for aftercoming and opposing reasoners, and no noticeable sign or signs of having forsaken the true course of thought throughout the whole length of his address.

There is, of course, in every case, however bad, a point of view in which it may appear to most advantage: to note this, and set it in this favourable light, is the duty of a pleader. When this point of view is gained, it is easy to see what proofs, statements, principles, or enactments bear directly upon the suit; and hence, those which slide by it and are superfluous. The orator, having ascertained this, may easily arrange in his mind a perfect summary of the case, and be able thereafter to decide upon the portions respectively capable of being made the topics of proofs, of eloquence, of ridicule, of statement, of apology, of infer-

ence, of appeal, or of quibble. In deciding on these, however, it is essential to remember that the only calculable result in legal controversy is that the conclusion come to by the hearers will have the force of the weakest part of the matter placed before them in linked array. It may be otherwise if circumstances are favourable, but more cannot be expected; hence, all known weak points should be thrown in incidentally, and carefully marked off as matters not really requisite to the maintenance of the case, though concurring to establish it.

Among the many items which supply internal topics for forensic eloquence, the following deserve general attention:—1st. Time; 2nd. Place; 3rd. Manner; 4th. Motive, or cause; 5th. Purpose, or end; 6th. Effects—certain, probable, and possible; 7th. Persons; 8th. Circumstances; 9th. Legal definitions; 10th. Similarities, or contrast; 11th. Essence and accident; 12th. The relations of the case to society and the law.

The topics supplied by the externals of a case are,—1st. Title of client to plead; 2nd. Form of process; 3rd. State of the law; 4th. The facts founded on; 5th. The witnesses; 6th. The condition of public opinion; 7th. Positive statutes; 8th. Precedents; 9th. Analogies; 10th. Illustrations; 11th. Complications to which the case is liable; 12th. Qualifications capable of being made to bring it under [or keep it beyond] the reach of the law.

The passions are the great movers of men. The orator who contents himself with arguments addressed to the intellect alone will have few triumphs; for the minds of most men, unhabituated to thinking, move slowly and reluctantly, while their passions, being constantly excited and exerted, are mobile, stirring, and influential. Hence the advocate must learn to touch the secret springs of the sympathies of men, and to move them so that they shall lean to his side of the case in hand. The true philosophy of the passions—much as men may revile metaphysics—forms an essential department of study. No one who desires to move his fellow-men can safely neglect so much of the teachings of that science as shall enable him to comprehend,—1st. When passion should be roused; 2nd. Why? 3rd. To what degree; 4th. By what means; 5th. In what manner; 6th. With what end; and 7th. On what grounds.

He who has acquired the tact by which passion is excited and managed can master men. Addresses to the passions rouse the dull, quicken the reflective, stir the stolid, affect the careless, and recall the absent-minded. They incline the will towards, or turn it from, the object of the speaker. They either insinuate an influence slyly into the mind which changes the course of thought, or abruptly impress the feelings, so as to cause them to wrest the reins from slow-deciding reason, and pull the will according to the bent they give to men's desires.

The forensic orator displays the fertility and fineness of his genius in his *invention*, but his prudence and tact in the *disposition* of his arguments, and the grace, ability, and excellence of his genius by his *expression* of them. In the choice of arguments an able orator will avoid all those which are erroneous, low, far-fetched, or useless. In the disposition of them he will carefully attend to their clearness, consistency, conformity to evidence, and effectiveness. In the expression of them he will aim not only at faultlessness but gracefulness; precision, propriety, purity, conciseness, unity, and beauty of expression will receive due attention; and he will not think it enough to utter a word which may do, while there is a possibility of using the word which he ought. Nor will it be enough even to employ the right word, on the right occasion, in a proper argument. It will often be necessary to adapt the form of an argument, and the style in which it is given, to the circumstances in which it is employed. In attention to these matters, there is scope sufficient for the exercise of taste, judgment, genius, scholarship, and legal acquirements.

We shall now run over, in a few expository sentences, the chief matters contained in our "Outline of the Elements of Forensic Eloquence" (p. 62); and first as regards,—

I. *The Client*.—The client, having entrusted his case, or had it entrusted for him, to the care of an advocate, has a right to expect that the best means shall be taken to secure the object of his suit. His view of the case is plain and simple, and he desires that it shall be so stated. Truth is of course the prime essential quality in any narrative, and as much as possible ought to be introduced into every recital of a case. Hence we affirm, that as regards a client, in general the chief requisite in the

orator's address which he desiderates is "a clear statement of his case." The means of presenting such a statement will generally be found if the orator lays before his mind the following three queries, viz.,—1. What are the facts? 2. Why are they so? 3. What are, have been, may or should be, the consequences of these facts? These being set plainly before the mind, the materials will readily develop themselves. The disposition of the details will depend on the object sought to be attained. It is advisable to fix upon an order of sequence, such as, of time, causation, testimony, effectiveness, &c. The narrative ought to be clear, consistent, and brief, and, of course, all the points which favour the orator's side of the case must be enforced, while the unfavourable parts are passed over slightly.

II. *The Judge*.—While the client makes these claims upon the counsel who pleads for him, and seldom consents to waive his expectations, because the deep personal interest he feels in his case urges him to observe his agent most critically, there is another watcher, whose duty it is even more imperatively to note the progress of the advocate's skilful craft,—the judge, the official administrator of the law. His demands are irresistible, and every pleader must be prepared to submit to his requirements in as far as the case permits. All judges do not insist on the same specific points. Some stickle for law, others are taken by claptrap; some are moved by logic, others by declamation; some decide by mere precedents, others by generalizations from them; some resign their souls to technicalities, others require reflection and incline to equity.

"Categorical definition" is advisable in all disputes; *a fortiori*, in law it is essential. Law is especially full of propositions declaratory of the meanings of terms. The whole relevancy of an action often depends on the legal acceptation of the words used in the instruments. To be thoroughly prepared in all matters, real or nominal, which may require definition or description, is highly requisite, and indeed is most frequently indispensable in oratory to be uttered in the presence of a judge.

After a careful induction of precedents has been summarized, as those to which it is found advisable to refer the case, and on which it is thought proper or expedient to *ground* any legal proceedings, there is required in most

cases a "*concise statement of the statutes*" and the judgments already pronounced, &c., on which the advocate relies. These must be laid before the judge. The arrangement of the address, so as to make the precise elements of an on-going case to which the statutes apply, at once and unmistakably apparent, requires skill and tact as well as learning. The statutes quoted must be consistent with the merits of the case, the applicability of the one to the other must be satisfactorily shown, and the statement should result in some practical solution of the difficulty which the lawsuit was brought to clear up or get rid of.

Legal precedents and statutory enactments, though appealed to, will not secure success in pleading, unless the orator is careful to preserve "*logical consistency of argument*." The law of non-contradiction is here imperative. The pleas put in must be consistent and consilient. He must proceed along convergent not divergent lines of argument, and this must be maintained by evidence and reasoning all tending in the same direction. If alterant or alternate issues be raised, they must be such as shall not conflict with each other. They must either possess a correlation, or a relation of subordination. They must not be, either in appearance or effect, opposites. The judge ordinarily requires that the "*tendencies and issues of the judgments sought*" should be explained, that he may perceive whether the ends aimed at by the suit agree with the motive or purpose of the law, and whether the granting of the demand of a client may be beneficial to society, just to others, and due to the claimant. This requires forethought and prudence in the advocate, and affords splendid scope for oratorical argumentation in most forensic contests.

A graver and grander possibility of effective eloquence lies in an "*appeal to the majesty and morality of the law*." In this topic there is always an opportunity for fire, force, energy, sagacity, and felicities of diction and reasoning. It should issue easily and naturally from the previous portions of a speech, and should increase in intensity, rapidity, earnestness, and solemnity as the close draws near.

III. *The Jury* (if any).—The jury require to be treated with discrimination and judgment. The power to read men, to find what is in them, and to discover what use may be made of them, is a valuable one. He who would ~~master~~

men by argument, or sway them by speech, must not only know well the might of thoughts and words, but must estimate their effectiveness upon the kind and class to whom he may address himself. To win men over to a given view, on whom the weight of a grave responsibility rests, requires a special adaptation of speech and argument, and many men who can affect a judge fail in effectively touching the minds of juries.

"*Effective narration*" is a strong point in any one engaged in conducting a case before a jury. A clear, well-told, yet seemingly inartistic story, attracts the larger number of minds, unable ordinarily to realize within themselves the piecemeal statements brought out in evidence. If to this graspable narrative there be added "*a popular statement of the worth of the evidence*" produced, or to be produced, on either side, and the whole be brought into a unity perceptible at a glance, or nearly so, the minds of ordinary men will frequently be found to acquiesce in the opinions founded upon it, and will be prepared to hold it as true.

Juries are theoretically said to be arbiters as regards the facts of a case. They never in practice confine themselves to this mere paltry office; they continually concern themselves with the effects of their verdicts. It is human and humane to do so; they cannot avoid the thought. But this very tendency and leaning supplies the adroit forensic orator with an occasion of enforcing or denying the "*cogency*" of arguments, and for "*appeals* for or against the expediency of the law,"—excellent themes for oratory. Juries have no special culture. They are placed in a position which makes them peculiarly alive to rhetorical artifices. They are prone to the movement of the passions. If the orator is skilful, and soothes their reason while he stirs their feelings, he can almost lead them as and whithersoever he would.

The forensic pleader is a controversialist. A lawsuit is a dispute brought before the national umpires for effective decision. It implies, therefore, a point of controversy on which issue may be taken or tendered. The whole phraseology of pleadings at law or in equity involve this controversial element. To the narration or complaint there follows the defence (if the case goes on). Whether this takes the shape of abatement, demurrer, or pleading in the action, there may ensue replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter,

surrebutter, &c., until the precise point or points in dispute between the parties in a suit are so developed as to present them in the form which is most convenient for decision, *i.e.*, as free as possible from extraneous matter, thoroughly sifted from ambiguity or avoidable complication. Here is wide scope for possible altercation.

Professional life of all kinds is as much beset with possible immoralities as that of the lawyer. There is nothing contrary to the best interests of mankind in the appointment in our courts of law, of that duel of skill, that controversy upon rights, duties, and responsibilities, to which we give the name of pleading. Nor is there anything essentially base or dishonourable in the advocate's employment of the best available means for securing the success of his client. Justice requires that the fairest possible statement of each party's case should be laid before the judge and jury who are to determine respectively upon the matters of law and the matters of fact involved in a cause, and that the ripest thoughts should be exerted to bring every case to the readiest and easiest issue. Without this no cause would be safe: least of all would any cause be safe if the habit of the legal profession was to decide in the pleader's chambers upon the merits of the cases offered to him. These considerations justify the existence of the pleader's art, and the pleader's art necessitates forensic eloquence. If we regard a legal-pleading as a pitched controversy we shall all the better comprehend the duties of—

IV. *Opposing Pleadings*.—The objects of law are the adjustment of disputed rights, the prevention of wrong, the determination of guilt or innocence. It therefore requires the weighing and sifting of evidence, the arrangement of facts and arguments, the fixing of points to be proved or disproved. Facts are its main concernment; then the interpretation of facts, and then the applicability of the positive statutes, or common law of the realm to the facts as interpreted. Right and wrong are the great questions always placed before the administrative judge. The duty of a pleader is to present his case in the best possible light in relation to his client, his opponent, the law, and the public of whose interests the law is the supreme guardian. The chief qualities which pleaders ought to manifest in debate may now be briefly stated and explained.

1. *Lucid exposition*.—Clearness is essential to cogency. Thinking and speaking in one simultaneous act presents peculiar difficulties in regard to the attainment of clearness. Either thought is too quick for speech, and then the orator is apt to overleap some step in the process of reasoning which is essential to place the matter of discourse fully and fairly before the minds of others less acquainted with the matter than the pleader to whom it has (or should have) been a special study; or thought is too slow, and then speech is dragging and heavy, expletive and tiresome, repetitive and redundant. In either case lucidity will be unattainable, unless in the former condition of mind sententious phraseology be employed to utter the thoughts as they arise, and the groundwork of the case be retraversed, and explained at large to the listeners; and in the former, unless the speaker shall manage by artful repetition of the same idea in well-varied language to fill the hearer's ear, and entertain their minds until the next idea has been gained and mastered. This may be done by the use of plain, strong, concise language at first, by following this with allusive and illustrative matter, and by repeating the same thought in more familiar expressions and more vernacular phraseology. Lucidity is best provided for by having stored in the memory, in their most concise and simple form, the several successive steps of the argument to be used, and noticing that, however frequently the terms employed in delivering it may be changed, no change,—either by addition, subtraction, or substitution—be made in the original argument, which must be kept, as a whole, steadily in view. The following suggestions may not be found ineffectual in guarding against obscurities of thought or language:—1st. Consider carefully (*a*) the point or points to be gained; (*b*) what would be sufficient to gain that or those; (*c*) how far the case in hand falls short of this; (*d*) how the point or points may be evaded by one or other of the parties; (*e*) what false principle may be most easily substituted for the true one in the case. 2nd. Having predetermined the consequences to be attained, search out a principle which will justify you in claiming them as effectively gained. 3rd. Graduate the facts and arguments so that they may follow in such an order as shall bring their full effects to bear upon the end aimed at. 4th. Attend to

the signification of all words used in the important arguments or statements; distinguish between the primary, particular, or common meaning of any terms, and sedulously avoid the use of those to which custom has attached any secondary sense detrimental to the case in hand; abstain from the employment of doubtful terms, and, when necessary, define the exact extent of signification in which special terms are used.

2. *Rapid conception in debate.*—All ideas are related. Consequences flow from premises, and decisions depend on proofs and arguments. By every admitted or advanced argument some portion of a cause is affected. The capacity to run out, ideally, to their consequences all statements and reasonings, and so of seeing whither they ultimately tend, is of prime importance. A constant habit of syllogizing, until it has become as active and irrepressible as an instinct, is almost the only practical way in which this rapidity of conception can be so gained as to be depended on. In an energetic highly cultured mind statements contain suggestions of the theories by which the facts they relate to may be tested or explained. The mind thus put in possession of all the possibilities must criticise these acutely, as well as instantly, and determine upon the most probable one—considered in relation to all the other evidence.

3. *Able cross-questioning.*—Evidence is the basis of every case. What are the facts, and what is the law, form the most important queries in every litigation. The eliciting of truth from a detached and promiscuous heap of witnesses, each differing in status, education, feeling, associations, acquaintance with the facts and methods of thought, or of thoughtlessness, from each other, is no easy task. The philosopher may warily guard against all surreptitious influences interfering with his experiments, and may carefully graduate his belief according to the accuracy of his instruments. The pleader must take the materials of evidence as they are given to him, and he must sift the truth out of these as best he may. To this end he must exert finesse to get at the minds of his witnesses, and to find, if possible, the habit of their thoughts. Unless a relation of some sort is thus secured between the witnesses and the advocate, mistake and misconception are almost certain.

4. *Ready retaliativeness and retort.*—Though legal pleading has been made mediatorial, expressly that the element of personality may be eliminated from the several causes before the courts, professional interests and jealousies must arise, and, in the heat of contest, get expression. Wit and hard hitting, as it is called, is always enjoyed by the public, besides being always pleasant in itself. These exert considerable influence on minds not specially trained to keep the current of their thoughts in view; and hence it is advisable to have even this weapon furnished up, so as to give as good as is given.

5. Each profession has its own standard of judgment as to what is right, fitting, and suitable in circumstance and act. To this, appeal may often be effectively made in favour of one's own action, or in opposition to the action of an antagonist.

V. *Public opinion.*—Loyalty to law is perhaps one of the chief characteristics of civilized man. He recognises law as the safeguard and protector of life, rights, property, and good name, and does not readily lend himself to revolt against its behests and decrees, so long as he observes them honestly carried out and fairly interpreted. But exactly in proportion to his lofty estimate of law, when thus enforced and applied, he is indignant and jealous at any attempt to wrest or misenforce it. It is of great consequence, then, that every pleader should so arrange his client's defences that their effects shall not be to excite public odium against his cause, or to enlist public sympathy in favour of his failure; in fact, not to attempt to gain a cause at law by means opposed to "the world and the world's law"—opinion.

That this offence may be avoided, we suggest the advisability of attending to the following particulars, viz. :—

1. The supplying of *careful and honest details*. On questions of fact all lawsuits depend. Facts always run into details; they are, as the ocean, circumstantial, and often vague. To find out the order of co-existence and of succession in them is of great moment in the discovery of truth. To get at the truth the facts must be disintegrated from the conceptions which witnesses form of the facts, and the inferences they deduce from them, or their ideas of them. Confidence in the rectitude of a cause is always felt when it

is known or thought that no concealment is practised by its advocates; and doubt is always excited when, for any reason, there is shown a desire to shirk inquiry, or to present only a partial account of the actualities on which any important consequences depend.

2. *The morality of the theory of law.* This is often a splendid theme for forensic eloquence. Times change, and men and customs change with them. The conscience of the people becomes more and more chary of mere technical criminality, and yet the law as existent must be honestly administered until changed and brought into accordance with the general moral feeling of the people. The discussion of the moral fitness of such a law may often be used as a topic of great force and effect by a skilful pleader.

To this effect and with this aim the orator may declaim upon (1) the general causes which have led to this deflection of the moral sentiments of the community from the existing code; (2) the beneficent tendency of this change; (3) the evil effects of giving force to laws opposed to the general voice of the public; (4) the special elements in the given suit which make the application of the law inexpedient, peculiarly grievous, or inappropriate; and (5) the possibility of having brought about the required results by laying the cause under a statute, or designating it by a term which would have been not less morally effective, while less penal and severe.

3. *The effects on social life of any particular statute, interpretation, or judgment.* Here there is opened an extensive field for eloquence. The relations of modern life are so intricate and manifold, that there are innumerable topics afforded to the orator in considering the law from this point of view. This, too, is a subject on which the public is widely interested, and hence it is likely to catch, with all the intensity of selfishness, at any matter favourable to the general welfare mooted under this head. As law is the regulator of civil life, and the director of social usages, every case, almost, supplies some ground for employing this powerful argument so as to affect public opinion.

4. Law is frequently held to be a secret and unknowable mystery—as, in fact, is every professional department of human skill and activity to those who stand without its bounds. This prejudice against it, as incomprehensible

and incalculable as to its results, may frequently be advantageously set aside by the pleader's *quotation of popular maxims*, and showing the exact accordance of his views as a lawyer with these generally received expressions of the common sense of the public. Especially with juries, this appeal to the stereotyped wisdom of their own class is useful, and often successful. The pleader who manages it well appears to them, from this circumstance, to ask only what is admittedly right and proper; and this bringing down of the lofty mysteries of the law to the capacities of ordinary people induces them to infer that the advocate who can do so is quite up to his business, and knows what he is about. The apparent superiority to professional chicane, even though the whole argument may be saturated with chicanery, which such a course suggests, compels a homage from most men, and influences them more than they would be willing individually to own.

5. *Personal considerations* may fairly be pleaded in certain circumstances with good results to the client—although the less frequently such a topic is employed by the same advocate the better. It is, however, allowable in some cases to plead (1) the personal character, (2) the peculiar circumstances, (3) the exceptional position, (4) the express condition of a client; and it is also occasionally permissible to bring before the court (1) the relation of the advocate to the case, (2) the general character of his practice, (3) the known system of advocacy he adopts, (4) the professional status he occupies. On these considerations public opinion may be moved; and from a moderate use of these, as topics, advantages to clients may arise.

6. A claim to *revision of a decision* is sometimes advantageously made a topic of forensic eloquence; and not unfrequently the advocacy of an *amendment of the law* may be effectively used as a mode of affecting public opinion in regard to the person in whose interest the pleader speaks. Law is the safeguard of individuals and of society; and forensic eloquence is the agency by which law is made effective and prevailing. To study and use it aright is the duty of legists. To know the secret of the efficacy of speech is essential to all those who may require to take part in the administration of law, or who assume the task of critics of the procedure of its courts.

CHAPTER V.

THE ELOQUENCE OF THE PULPIT.

THE power of the pulpit is immense. Its influences are incorporated with all the ongoings of human life. The Christian church is not only a vast, widely diffused organization for teaching and worship; it is also an incessantly active administrative and co-operative association, exerting its activity among mankind with a certainty, regularity, uniformity, system, and persuasiveness, which brings all sorts and conditions of men in some degree within the sweep of its management. It is pliable, adaptive, and vigilant; its agencies are rich, various, and apt; and its officials, either by duty or through interest, act upon and intertwin themselves with all the affairs of our race. To it has been committed, in a great measure, the most noble intellectual and moral means of affecting men, as well as the richest treasury of influences with which the world has been endowed. Eloquence, the utterance of living thought—quick, passionate, and new-born—has been imparted to it as a means of stirring the emotions, guiding the life, and affecting the destiny of men. Themes have been given to it so transcendent in their importance as to outstrip the estimate of conception. And opportunities have been consecrated to its service with greater frequency, uniformity, and habit-forming recurrence, than to any other form of influencing men by speech. The well-weighed and carefully tested teachings of men who have garnered and sifted the products of thought in the study are brought into immediate and intimate relations with the minds of the devout and serious. The tone of the speaker's voice and mind, the character of the man and the class of which he is a member, the nature of the circumstances in which congregations assemble, the original matter of the truths he is to utter, and the hot, living forth-flow he may impart to his instructions, exert effects in favour of the pulpit orator of which no other species of eloquence receives the benefit. The duty of every public speaker is—as far as is consistent with his theme and aim—to inform, persuade, convince, and

please,—to call into activity in his hearers the understanding, the feelings, the emotions, and the imagination, that they, unitedly operating, may affect the whole intellectual and moral nature of those addressed. It is incumbent upon that man who would work out the highest purposes of oratory, not only to communicate information and direct the flow of thought, but also to stimulate the active principles of our nature, and to quicken the determining powers within us. To establish truth is not enough, though it were demonstrated with the irresistibility of mathematics. Men must have aroused within them a desire to accept, adopt, and act upon the truth advanced; must be convinced of its relevancy to their case and needs, must be inspired with a purpose regarding it—which shall not glimmer dimly or blaze fitfully in the soul, but yield a permanent and useful life-guiding light. If all public speakers should supply both thought and impulse, wisdom and guidance, it is, of course, far more essential that the occupant of a pulpit should impart both. He is by profession an instructor and reformer. Truths more sublime, important, and vital with excellent interest than science, speculation, or history can otherwise yield, are given into his charge. With these he is to edify “the whole body of the people.” But these truths have a bearing upon the entire circle of human duties, hopes, aspirations, and fears; on life and conduct; on faith and practice; and this connection of truth with act and fact, this influence of belief on behaviour, this co-operating of the revelations of heaven with the requirements of earth, this exhibition of the life enwrapped in life which man lives, requires to be brought efficaciously before the minds of men, that they may determine the way of their life by them, and fashion their public and their private conduct to the mode which they prove to be right and holy.

Correct views of pulpit eloquence are rare either among clergy or laity. Hence there arises double injury to the church and to society. Hearers make demands upon those who address them in a congregational capacity, quite alien to the first teachings of rhetoric regarding effective preaching; and clergymen, misled by false inductions, contract habits of oratory at variance with good taste and intellectuality. These acting and reacting upon each other constitute a formalism and a traditionalism from which both

parties would be better freed. Congregations, if made aware of the special fallacies to which they subject their thoughts in the criticism of sermons, might learn charity, forbearance, and receptiveness ; and clergymen, if they had a hint of the peculiar liabilities to error to which they were exposed from their professional position, might be induced to study the teachings of science as guides and interpreters of their inductions—and mutual benefits might ensue.

A sermon signifies, etymologically, a connected discourse intended to implant some productive thought in the mind of others. In ordinary speech it is usually applied to an address delivered to an assembly of persons gathered together for devotional purposes as a Christian congregation. Sermons are based upon some portion, less or more, of the Scriptures, to which they call attention, on which they enlarge, and which influences in some degree both the form and matter of the entire discourse. The passage selected from the Bible is called a *text*. Of this text a sermon ought properly to be an exposition. It should include not only a paraphrase of the passage discoursed from, a commentary upon its signification, and an exhortation regarding the fulfilment of the duties it enjoins or implies, but also an application of the teaching it involves to the personal circumstances of different classes of hearers. The chosen portion of the holy writings ought always to be really a text—not a pretext, a mere motto for an essay, or a formal concession to custom and fashion in such oratory. This text ought to form, at least, the under-current of the flowing thought which takes its rise from it, should be integrated and incorporated with the didactic, critical, or hortatory matter of which the discourse may otherwise consist.

The word *Homiletics* is sometimes employed to designate the art of preaching in that compound form of instruction and persuasion which the pastor of a congregation requires to adopt in the pulpit, and to adapt to the people placed under his charge. Sacred Rhetoric has also been used as a name for that series of instructions which is regarded as necessary to enlighten students on the elements requiring attention in the composition of a sermon. A homily, however, differs from a sermon in being entirely devoid of art or oratory, in being a plain, unvarnished

forth-following of the scriptural text or narrative, with here and there, as they naturally arise, the moral reflections or hortatory applications expressed as they are suggested. It is not methodless, though unmethodical. It allows a greater freedom of digression and allusion than the sermon; it is less compact in its structure, plainer in its style, and more accordant with the ordinary operations of the mind than is usual in sermons. Less logic is employed on it, and the play of suggestion, emotion, forms of speech, &c., is permitted to have greater scope. It is more the expression of thought as it grows up in the mind than as it is trained, espaliered, and woven into closely intertextured unity of aim, method, and shapeliness.

Pulpit eloquence is peculiar to modern history. Among the nations of antiquity there was a sacerdotal caste, a priesthood, but they had no religious doctrines or tenets which they taught to the people that their lives might be influenced by them. The moral improvement of the people did not then concern the priest, but the legislator. Religion was neither, in their economy, a duty nor a privilege; it was a luxury. Instruction in duty, persuasion to well-doing, or dissuasion from evil works, formed no portion of the priestly functions. Their worship and its mysteries were for the initiated and the wealthy, not for the bulk of the people, and least of all for the slaves. The idea of aggregating men in masses having a vital and organic unity and corporate being, as the mere result of the exposition of doctrine and the calling forth of faith in the hearers; and of making that faith not only the bond of union, but also the effective agent in giving identity of aim, feeling, and character to all the various members of the congregation, is not only grand in itself, but it was essentially original. It is a distinctly Christian institution.

To the Great Teacher we owe the inauguration of the era of universal public instruction. This was an innovation of greater magnitude and importance than can at first sight be credited. Schools both of prophets and philosophers had existed aforetime. A sort of freemasonry of knowledge was kept up among statesmen, legislators, and priests. Nobles might hire instructors, and merchants employ tutors; but for the people, the masses of men, there were neither schools nor teaching.

Jesus Christ appointed a system of popular education, commissioned a body of "preachers of righteousness," gave them doctrines and commandments, and then trusted, with a divine confidence, in the simple power of truth to impress men's minds, affect their lives, and raise up within them a zeal for good works which should be not only according to knowledge, but also the natural outgrowth of their being when renewed by faith in Him, His work, and His will.

The eloquence of the pulpit has for its chief word Duty. It recognizes man as a moral and religious being; it aims at impressing him with an idea of the transcendent claims of the Most High to obedience, the very yielding of the heart's desires to Him. It seeks to elevate man's thoughts to the divine Source of Being; to awe the soul with an abiding sense of God's presence; to encourage to good works by the thought of His all-seeing eye, of His loving heart, and of His approving smile; to excite to inward virtue by the promise of His love and loving help; to deter from vice by the unfolding of the conditions of our being as responsible agents before the holy lawgiver, and in the prospect of our marvellous endowment with immortality. It offers to our view the perfect life of the great Ensample of all holiness; it brings before us the mercy and the magistracy of our Father; it holds out for our acceptance the aid of the Holy Spirit and the divine instrumentalities of salvation, and it reveals to us the means whereby we may acquire that perfect walk with God which marks a holy living, provides for a holy dying, and supplies a sure hope of bliss beyond the hour and power of death. The preacher can lay his finger upon every spring of human thought, feeling, or act, and touch it to divine purposes; he can excite fear, entrance hope, inspire awe, impart resolve, effect repentance, and convert souls. True eloquence, try it as often as heart can wish, never fails in its effectiveness; it is an issue from the God of power,—let us use it in the cause of His truth, love, and righteousness.

The chief objects aimed at by the institution of the ordinance of preaching, and therefore to be effected by pulpit eloquence as an agent, are—1. Conversion; 2. Edification; 3. Christian fellowship; 4. Encouragement in holy living; 5. Devotional feeling; 6. Preparation for futurity. The

mental powers upon which the preacher may act, while endeavouring to effect these results, are primarily—1. The intellect; 2. The will; 3. The imagination; 4. The passions; 5. Or any combination of these leading faculties of the soul. There thence arise five special forms of sermons, which may be perhaps best exhibited in the following table:—

SERMONS

<i>affecting</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>and may be</i>
I. Intellect	i. Expository	1. Explanatory and informing. 2. Demonstrative and argumentative.
II. The will	ii. Persuatory or Admonitory	1. Stimulant to goodness. 2. Reprehensive of evil.
III. Imagination	iii. Commendatory	1. Devotional. 2. Sympathetic. 3. Panegyric.
IV. Passion	iv. Hortatory	1. Historical. 2. Logically suasive. 3. Epical or dramatic.
V. Combinations of thought, feeling, and will	v. Controversial	1. Affirmative or supporting. 2. Negative or rebutting. 3. Critical { <i>a.</i> Historical. <i>b.</i> Logical. <i>c.</i> Descriptive.

The varieties of style and treatment are as innumerable as are the topics on which pulpit instruction may be expended. Cold dialectic may alternate with exquisite pathos, unambitious familiarity with elegance and grace, plain statement with sublime rapture, narrative monotony with the indescribable onrush of imagery the passions excite; invective may be used to sharpen the edge of exposition, and simple instruction may be heightened to profound theology or fervent devotion. Judicious and methodical minds will arrange their sermons with order, clearness, and effectiveness, and devotional divines will express themselves with frank, benevolent tenderness, and yearning, passionate reiteration. Some sermons will be characterized by a measured and majestic tone, others by a torrent-force and rapidity; some by amiable candour and delicacy of thought, others by sinewy logicity and unhesitant dogmatism; one may exhibit the solemn march of great ideas, another persistent tenacity of purpose; one may deal with the gentle

charities of Christ, another may treat of the terrible vengeance of offended Deity; one may comfort, another admonish, a third rebuke; one may be distinguished by the skill of its exposition, another by the happy tact of its argument, and a third by the brilliant light of intense thought. It is possible in all these ways to work upon the human heart, or even to mingle the magic of these means in the process of eloquent utterance.

The oratory of the pulpit is exercised under peculiar conditions. The preacher chooses his own subject with forethought, leisure, and the opportunity of adapting the treatment to his taste, and proportioning its style to his powers. He is not expected, far less required, to speak extemporaneously; but as a general rule, provision is made to secure for him time for accurate premeditation and studious adaptation of the matter of his discourse to the special requirements of his auditors, and his own object in fixing upon his theme. He is free from interruption or the statement of objections. His remarks are not liable to instant controversy, nor is he called upon to make immediate (if any) reply to hearers who may be inclined to question either his statements or his inferences. Silence waits upon his utterances, and contention refrains from distracting either hearers or speaker. He addresses his audience as an "ambassador for Christ," as holding a divine commission, and delivering "a message from God." He discourses as "one having authority"—in general, to a known and subordinate auditory, who acknowledge his claim, and admit the sovereignty of the supreme Power, as the expositor of whose will the preacher appears among them.

No secular orator has such presumptions in favour of an amicable reception and a patient hearing, such prefatory advantages and preliminary encouragements; neither has he the awe-inspiring and love-exciting ground of acceptance for his sayings which the preacher derives from the character of the Book on which he founds his teachings, or the interests which he appeals to as his reasons for being heard. The secular speaker has his oratory circumscribed by the occasion which excites it, the motives to which it can address itself, the worldly atmosphere in which he meets his audience, and the strictly temporal objects to which he

must confine the chief proportion of his remarks in keeping true to the question.

It is as true on the other hand, however, that the eloquence of the pulpit is exerted under conditions disadvantageous to its effectiveness, to which secular eloquence is not subject. Among the obstacles to the success and effectiveness of pulpit eloquence there may be noted—1. In the people, familiarity with the phrases and doctrines of Christianity, and in the preacher the sense of professionalism; 2. The preparedness of the mind of the speaker who utters the reflex of former thoughts, and of the hearer who comes ready to assent to the essential truth of each address; 3. The staidness of the occurrence and recurrence of preaching, or the indurating power of habit; 4. the impersonality of pulpit addresses, and of the application of its matter in the hearer's mind; 5. The fallacious feeling of distance between time and eternity in speaker and hearer. The pulpit orator is not, however, exposed to these difficulties without some countervailing advantages. He has the benefit—1. Of speaking with authority; 2. From acknowledged standards; 3. To persons professedly submissive to his teaching and their contents; he has, besides—4. The habit of devotion and attention; 5. The sympathy of numbers; 6. The personal affection of his flock; 7. The prejudice of society in favour of established procedures; and 8. The readiness of men to acknowledge the advantages of the inculcation of moral and religious truth.

The passions are the great motive powers of men. The strongest stir of their being is often occasioned by the excitement of their most temporary appetites, their most superficial emotions, or the grossest of their passions; and their pulse is more readily quickened by the gratifications of sense than the pleasures of taste or the most wondrous results of the reason of man. Now it is precisely to subdue passion and subordinate appetite—to excite the nobler emotions and to enlarge the power of reason—to lessen the influence of sight and sense and to increase the effective force of holiness and faith, that pulpit eloquence has been placed among the agencies of heaven. The oratory that moves is easy of acquisition, the eloquence that convinces is ill to get. Agitation is a simple matter; *persuasion* is a complex as well as a prevailing power. The

energy of mere passion will evoke the former, the latter requires the combined and well-arranged exercise of steady force, stern integrity, acute sensibility, effective reasoning, active sympathy, intelligent exposition, and the earnest yet honest vitality of every human emotion. Conviction is persuasion raised to the power of changing the ingrained habits of men, and vanquishing their stubbornest inclinations.

Controversy occasions lively excitement, rouses the energies of the disputants, and engages the interests of the listeners. In contending with an adversary the sense of personality is set aglow, the eagerness for conquest is increased, the fear of defeat is awakened, and the clash of conflict brings out the flash of mental ardour. The heat, speed, and force of thought are each augmented as the fresh reply rises up in extemporaneous attractiveness—new alike to thinker and to hearer; and the speaker, animated by the free motion of his own mind, finds himself enlivened; while the auditory, having their passions subjected to the friction of the antagonism, warm into emotive attentiveness, and watch the fray with the gleaming eyes of ardent and interested spectators. The quietude and silence of the sabbath's sedate listeners, who come devotionally inclined, and ready to acquiesce in the lessons of the day, are not therefore unattended with drawbacks, when regarded as conditions of eloquence.

"The palpable and the familiar" appeal far more strongly to the emotions and passions of men than the distant, the reversionary, and the uncertain; things seen and time present come so much nearer to the eye, and closer to the heart, than those which are unseen and eternal, that the eloquence of the sacred functionary who attempts to change the indistinct feeling of the super-sensual world into clear comprehension, and to expand into full bloom the buds of spiritual life latent in the human soul, has much to overmaster as well as to accomplish. To get into the deep, intricate, many-chambered, and deceitful heart, every throb of which is in accord with the world, and in rebellion against the law and power of holiness—to get into this anarchy the might and influence of the empire of Jehovah, is not an easy work. Our lives are alloyed by circumstances; our souls are annoyed by cares; our hearts are

grown sordid and our spirits debased ; we are conformed to the outward world of sense more than the inward law of the spirit : and we are prone to the fallacy of mistaking near things for great things, and of regarding the uncertain as distant. Hence the eloquence of the pulpit must not only impel our thoughts in a new direction, but compel them to turn aside from their old customary ways, repel the solicitations of inveterate habits, and take a new departure for the discovery and attainment of the ways of peace, righteousness, and salvation. This implies in the preacher such an intensity, earnestness, vigour, attractiveness, and overpowering vehemence of thought and speech, as evicts commonplace from the number of his agencies. To induce to self-revision and to life-change, to put an end to indifference and self-security, to incite to self-condemnation, and incline the heart to new obedience—not reluctantly, but lovingly : in short, to communicate the inspiration of a nobler life, requires in the orator who would accomplish them excellences most difficult to attain and retain. The success of the ministry, as far as human sagacity can extend : the growth and diffusion of moral purity in the land : the suffusion of man's nature with the truths of the gospel, and the regenerating influences of vital religion, depend upon the eloquence of the pulpit being both sufficient and efficient. It is true that the clergy bear the message of God to guilty man "in earthen vessels," but that is no reason why they should display their mere earthiness, especially if they, by so doing, disincline any one from gladly partaking of the

"River of celestial drink,
Flowing unto us from the heaven's brink ;"

or restrain one heart from being made a delighted sharer in that—

"Rarest union that can be,
'Twixt that of Godhead and humanity."

Eloquence aims at persuasion. It seeks not only to express but to impress thought. This is its final purpose, its true end. If the orator desires to transfuse his ideas into another's mind, to sow the seed of an after-harvest of fruitful change, to exert the "discourse of reason" for the working out of a predetermined purpose, he must fulfil the

laws of eloquence, or he will not attain his efforts' end and aim. Eloquence is an instrumental not a final art—it effects its purpose not for itself alone. Religion, on the other hand, uses persuasion as a means not as an end. Religion aims at implanting in the spirit divine truth as a constant, active principle of life—as a principle out of which all the phenomena of virtue, good manners, and holiness shall grow; philanthropy, benevolence, the charities and courtesies of social life, sympathy, domestic affection, friendship, civic and municipal existence, patriotism and worship, all attaining a fuller, nobler, more conscious, because a new, being in the spirit. Humanity is one of the choicest gifts of God. To live up to its awful responsibilities is man's calling. To educate his entire being to the fulfilment of duty, the promotion of right, and the performance of the holy, has been made incumbent on man as man. Religion has been given to enable us to subordinate all that is within us to the divine inner law of life so thoroughly, that love shall supersede law, and duty shall become desire; so truly, that all our ordinary human life shall harmonize with the one Eternal Life in the image of whom we are made, and whose likeness in Christ we are bound to re-attain in holiness, righteousness, and truth.

Religion may—indeed, we should say, must—employ the instrumental art of eloquence that it may effectively persuade men to vital godliness; not to the omission or neglect of any of its own special issues, forces, influences, and institutions, but for the right and proper concurrent use of them all. Eloquence is the art of placing opinions before men in the manner most conducive to persuasion and conviction. As truth is mightier than falsehood, so it is able to make headway against its wily antagonist, notwithstanding the perverse and mistaken carelessness of its advocates as to the best methods of statement which study can reveal or science disclose. But it is evident that if we leave to falsehood all the armoury of attack and defence, and reserve to truth only the innate resistiveness of her own might, we act as traitors, not as true men. Eloquence is not the weapon of falsehood unless we basely surrender it to his use; truth may wield it as well as, nay, far better, than falsehood can; and in refusing or neglecting to employ eloquence in the service of truth we in reality

disarm her and expose her, all the while that we claim to be her true friends. To preach repentance the orator must aim at persuasion. In fact, every sermon should be a persuasive discourse. Eloquence indicates the means of persuasion, and religion employs eloquence as her auxiliary, because persuasion is a means of gaining her ends—repentance and reform. But no man can make a deep and salutary impression on the heart who merely declaims about duty, and truth, and newness of life. In eloquence earnestness is everything. Fervour, ardour, energy, characterize the man who speaks, with lips unfeigned, true words out of a true heart. He who expresses the language of his own convictions gives them cogency and clearness; inculcates the duties that flow from the reception of his opinions with seriousness, sense, and concern; and advocates with solemnity and warmth the solid advantages which must result from following the course which he advises. Hence it has come to pass that all pulpit orators are more or less subjected to a public preliminary declaration of their faith, as a guarantee—as good, perhaps, as can be gotten under the conditions of life in which we exist at present—that they believe what they preach, and will, as a matter of course, preach what they believe.

This condition of pulpit eloquence exerts—perhaps unavoidably—a twofold evil influence on the success of preaching. In the first place, it affects the orator by hampering the free exercise of his mind, by holding always before both his consciousness and his conscientiousness the duty of keeping his opinions within certain limits and restraints, and by this very watchfulness diminishing the direct and entire forthputting of all his mental energy to pursue the quarry of his thoughts to their home-region in ultimate truths. It also inclines him, as the safer course, to circumscribe the outgoing of his researches into other districts than those of commonplace and of reputed orthodoxy. Hence he oftener elaborates into classic finish or composite passableness, by dint of hammer and chisel, graver and etching-tool, ideas to which ages have given acceptance, than enters the mine and works in the excavation of new material, on which he could make the mark of his own mind, and which he might fashion after his own ideal; or he employs himself in the reproduction, in all available

shapes and conditions, of a few carefully selected axioms and maxims of theology, as gracefully and artistically as he can, though they too frequently, as images not the realities of truth, betray a want of vital force and godly fervour.

On the other hand, however, the fact that each pulpit orator is pledged to a special declaration of his faith, though it may be accepted as a certificate of honest conviction, often suggests the notion that he is giving utterance, in his sermons, to the results of investigations pursued with a foregone conclusion, and so liable, if not to doubt yet to distrust. This prejudicial criticism—no less injurious to the speaker than to the hearer—is no proper exercise of the right of private judgment. It is censoriousness rather than examination. Yet it cannot be doubted that it exerts a distinct and readily appreciable influence upon the reception of Christian truth from the lips of its acknowledged advocates, and operates detrimentally upon and within society. It is difficult for mankind to credit a speaker's independence of thought when he is known to be committed beforehand to the reproduction, in his ministrations, of thoughts, sentiments, and applications in unison with a set of articles signed and subscribed by him as a preliminary to his admission into the church of which he is a teaching member. It is not, however, merely in suggesting this preliminary notion of interestedness and predeterminate bias that this uprise of feeling affects the results of the eloquence of the pulpit to the greatest extent. The orator flashes forth the influence of his thought into a region of phenomena where will operates, where desires and motives act, react, and interact, and where their effects intertwist in such a manner as to baffle prevision, unless the fullest acquaintance with the secret springs of determination has been gained by the speaker, and there be plain dealing between his auditory and himself. Now nothing is so repressive of quick, earnest, enthusiastic thought as the criticism of distrust. It cools in the speaker the very enthusiasm which eloquence demands, and it sets the whole feelings and emotions of the auditory in opposition to the doctrines and inducements of the orator.

Upon our preachers of all denominations the effects are felt more than understood. Through fear of being thought theatrical, the preachers of our day affect to be motionless

mouthpieces of remembered composition. That they may escape the charge of extravagance and sensationalism, they confine themselves to temperate expostulation, calm argumentation, rational demonstration, or chaste ornateness and vivacious correctness. Knowing that their hearers are jealous of being deceived by oratory, they allow the coldness of reserve to creep over their manner, and deepen the distrust of the people in their earnestness by the cautious polish they bestow on their customary expositions of the (to them) commonplaces of the orthodox faith. In subserviency to the prejudices of their auditory, they actually give apparent confirmation to their doubts, and abate the aggressive influences of their eloquence in proportion to the thickness of the barriers intervened between their advocacy of divine truth and the hearer's receptiveness; over-caution on either side widening the distance, and augmenting the misunderstanding, though the one is anxious to speak with honesty, and the other to hear with candour.

Eloquence is persuasive oratory. Religion is the interpreter of life, and eloquence is the interpreter of religion. Eloquence endeavours to set religion persuasively before the minds of men; and religion, as "the ministry of reconciliation," when it works upon, into, and throughout the heart, originates within them "newness of life," perfects their nature, changes their character in its inner essence, but chiefly alters their relationship with "God in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.

This change must not only be brought about by preaching, but preaching—as the human agent of a Divine purpose—must sustain it. It must not only say "Move!"—it must also cry "Advance!" It is not only to give the order, "Rise up and walk," but to continue to insist upon a "walk *towards* God," to be afterwards, by grace, changed into a "walk *with* God." The Scriptures are a gospel of progress, and therefore its preachers must be masters of persuasion, that they may incline men both to will and to do God's good pleasure. Christianity desires to Christianize men, to make them Christ-like by making them love Christ. The best form of Christian eloquence will be, therefore, that which most nearly resembles the teaching of *the Great Master* of Assemblies. The characteristics of

Christ's teaching may be summed up in these following items, viz., clearness, distinctness, earnestness, force, naturalness, appropriateness, illustrativeness, and purity.

1. *Clearness* refers both to words and thoughts; the former of which ought to be the simplest possible and suitable, and the latter such are capable of being comprehended to the extent required at the time by the persons addressed, in full consideration of the state of their culture and the ordinary habits of their minds in thinking.

Clearness of language depends upon the customary speech of the people upon whom argumentation is employed. Its condition is not adequately fulfilled when an orator uses words which they may or might understand if they gave heedful thought to his address. It is the preacher's express vocation to *gain* their devoted attention, and to retain it. He must fix in his mind, therefore, an idea of the kind of speech likely at once to express his thought and impress his hearers, the degree and amount of intent reflection they are accustomed to, or may be brought to bestow on the matters of his sermon, and to calculate accordingly, so that his style may not be a veil but a transparency between his ideas and the minds of his auditory. Similarly, clearness of thought requires that we should settle in our own minds well the precise and exact thought whose image we desire to pass over into another mind; that we should assure ourselves of the simplicity of that thought, and its adaptability for conveyance in the manner, at the time, in the circumstances, and to the persons to whom we intend to communicate it. Hence, as Quintilian says, "The meaning of a discourse should strike the mind as the light of the sun does the eyes, though they are not intently fixed on it," *i.e.*, it should be clear in itself, and in its medium.

2. *Distinctness* demands the absence of all ambiguity as definitely as clearness opposes itself to any obscurity. "Doubtful disputations" are not only not to be admitted, but anything tending towards the creation or excitement of doubt,—where it has rightly no place. Our thoughts should be carefully analyzed, the differences between one and another scanned and seen. Anything likely to confuse our own or another's mind should be expertly laid aside, so that the whole regard of the thinkers, whether speaking or listening, may be given with accurate precision to the self-

same idea at the self-same time. The ideas being discriminated with perfect unmistakability from each other, the words chosen should be selected with the design of expressing, in the most adequate manner, and in the most suitable and intelligible terms, the very thought on which our mind has been dwelling, without the possibility of suggesting any other nearly resembling or much akin to it, lest it should enter the mind of another instead of that which we desire to transfer to him from ourselves. Intelligibility is only attainable by close and sedulous care to acquire clear and distinct notions, and to utter them in clear and distinct terms. Upon no other conditions can the orator acquire the first great accomplishment of his art than on those mentioned. To be understood is the prime aim of every genuine orator; for unless his meaning is comprehended, how can it be followed, and how can the result he wishes be brought about, in, or among those who know not what he means? Not only, therefore, in a theological—or even in a neological—sense, but with a plain, downright, ordinary, and every-day signification, to say, let “no uncertain sound” be heard from those who exercise as their calling “the eloquence of the pulpit.”

3. *Earnestness*.—Ardent zeal, intensity of desire, vehement solicitude, and diligent endeavour, are all requisite to stir, to rouse, to stimulate, and to compel the unthinking and careless to serious consideration. The dull and degraded, the tempted and the scorned, the self-satisfied and the unconcerned, the make-believer and the unbeliever, may delight to have their fancy tickled by careful syntax and by graceful speech, may admire bombast and enjoy the glittering rhetoric of the pulpit performer, whose chief endeavour is to please an audience and to fill a church; but it is sorry policy either to suffer rigid formulism or frigid formalism, adroit time-serving or plausible priestliness, conceited folly or pretentious pliancy, to acquire the mastery in congregations. An earnest man in the world, as it is, must strike—strike and be heard—even strike to be heard. He cannot palliate and gloze, tamper and trifle, he must fling all the energy of his being's love for God and man into the task of winning souls. He makes himself wise to know, and he prays and labours to be sinewed for performance. To effect *his purpose he must affect his hearers and he struggles and*

agonizes to achieve the work given him to do. Stoutness, courage, and intrepidity to resist the conservative clamours of iniquity, the pleadings of sin for time, and of the soul for indulgence; fearlessness to probe the gross and peccant humours of the heart, to check with incisive instantness the spread of vileness, to neutralise contagion, and to wreak from the soul "the perilous stuff" which deteriorates with its deleterious venom the social state and personal condition of men, are all required of the true preacher of righteousness. To be earnest is for him an inevitable necessity. If he fail in earnestness to whom is committed the oracles of God for the salvation of man, where shall we look to find ardour of heart and intensity of daring to accomplish any good work? Without the earnestness of the pulpit orator conviction of mind is, humanly speaking, impossible; for men too frequently calculate the value of that which is pressed on their notice at less than that which it is represented to be worth, and if the advocate talks coolly of its importance, they can scarcely believe in its intrinsic worth.

4. *Force* is the exponent of power. Earnestness is fervour infelt, and stirring all the activities of thought to work out its eagerly desired heart's wish. It is the moral motive of force, and force is a chief condition of success. Force of feeling results from earnestness. Force of will is only earnestness in active effectiveness. These give vigour to thought and power to words. They give directness, too, which augments the effect of force, and moves more readily the resisting object on which it is discharged. Persuasiveness is force of mind applied to mind, an outflow of the vitality of thought from one to others, moving them to change. Force of expression much depends on fitness, force of thought on circumstance, but the pulpit orator can never be at a loss for forcible thought if he utters the whole counsel of God clearly, distinctly, and earnestly—as he finds it recorded in his own soul after mature, careful, and prayerful study of the Scriptures.

5. *Naturalness*.—Far-fetched, super-subtle, and over-refined words, figures, or ideas, may dazzle, but must confuse thought. Life and light ought to be manifest in every discourse. The heart-beat of the vital heart should be recognisable at once. There is no greater mistake possible than to suppose that because eloquence is an art it must

either be intended to oppose or supersede nature. "The art itself is nature."

6. *Appropriateness*.—Suitability of thought and expression must be regulated by many considerations of time, place, circumstance, subject, speakers, hearers, and intent. All topics are not appropriate for pulpit addresses; all styles are not fitted to impress and persuade; with an honest intent a wrong time may be chosen for a discourse, or a wrong way may be taken in managing it. An injudicious speaker may excite revulsion against a theme by untimely and inapt choice of time and place. A style which suits an old preacher sits ill on a young one, and greater privileges of address on peculiar relations of life, and on matters relating to experimental Christianity, are accorded to an aged pastor than to one young in the ministry. Tact and good sense, reflectiveness and sympathy, are the true teachers of appropriateness.

7. *Illustrativeness*.—Abstract thought is seldom pursued with relish. In the severer regions of intellectuality few desire to walk constantly or long. The ideas like to be engaged on familiarities, and to be in close communion with every-day life. Hence the fondness of the mind for figures of speech. These give the mind the long, high-bounding feel of life. Though the soul may love occasionally to cast an eye-glimpse on supernal truth, yet it is seldom long in the region of pure thought without inclining to exclaim,—

"I love it not—the science nor the scene;
I long to know again the fresh green earth,
The breathing breeze, the sea and sacred stars.
These recollections crowd upon me now,
As constellations in the evening sky,
And will not be forgotten."

The Sovereign Parablist knew well what was in man, and He has supplied a copious plentitude of earthly objects which "the kingdom of heaven may be likened unto." He linked into double suggestiveness nature and godliness, and with divine illustrativeness transfused into the universe a moral poetry, and made the meanest things of earth symbolic of the miracles of Heaven's grace. Of the proper management of figurative language no better specimens *can be quoted* than those which are familiar, even to fasci-

nation, to diligent students of Scripture. The illustrations employed should be interesting, easily understood, appropriate, suggestive, consistent with the aim of the discourse, yet brief enough not to interfere with the unity, symmetry, and general purport of the sermon, of which they should form but an auxiliary part.

8. *Purity*.—"To the pure," of course, "all things are pure." But in a mixed audience we can scarcely expect that all minds will possess the unstainable moral purity which results from the possession of an unsullied heart. The pure in heart have the kingdom of God dwelling within them; but in worldly natures, such as men's ordinarily are, purity of inner feeling and associations are too unfrequent. Care, therefore, is requisite to avoid the use of words, phrases, or illustrations which set in motion trains of associations suggestive of anything impure,—not sensual only, but sensuous. Purity of thought is not enough to secure this; but a close and intimate acquaintance with the phraseology, habits of feeling, and customary associations of the people. In the choice of subjects offences against purity need seldom occur; in historical allusions they do not require to be frequent, nor ought they ever to be noted or commented on, unless there are no others equally serviceable, or the subject imperatively demands reference to or quotation of them. By purity of thought we do not merely mean abstinence from pruriency of suggestion, but from any word likely to carry the thoughts sinward, and so defeat the very aim of the eloquence of the pulpit. Purity of phrase includes not only the use of moral terms, but also the employment of words in use by the masters of our language, and hallowed by time.

We have thought it so important to impress upon our readers a just preliminary view of preaching, that we have left ourselves less space than will now suffice to treat as we ought to do on—1st. The personal qualities of a good preacher; 2nd, the choice of subjects; and 3rd, The qualities of good sermons as compositions, *e.g.*, *unity* of parts, aims, structure, and style; *particularity* and *precision* of topic and handling, as opposed to generality and vagueness; *conciseness*, by the avoidance of commonplace, and tedious, self-evident remarks; *aptness* for their purpose and in their form, to the text and to the hearers; *interest*

in subject, style, manner; truth of matter, of composition, and of delivery, and to Scripture taste and the professional status of the orator.

Of the style preferable in the pulpit much also might be said. Without interfering with the natural disposition or aptitudes of individual preachers, we may say that simplicity, perspicuity, scripturality, and dignity of phraseology, are indispensable; that uncouth, quaint, smart, foppish, obsolete, new-fangled, or merely learned diction, is to be eschewed, and that cautious accuracy in the selection of words, and abstinence from the use of recurrent synonymous terms, are highly advisable.

In the structure of a discourse it is essential that it be textual, logically coherent, and consistent; free from cross-divisions, or overlapping theses. The divisions ought to be the fewest possible in which the thought of the sermon can be exhausted; and they should be mutually illustrative, and concurrently applicable to the point or points under consideration.

In delivery the manner ought to be sincere, grave, earnest, devout, and unostentatious; varying in tone with the matter of the discourse; modest, and free from elocutionariness, fluent yet distinct, and partaking as much of the nature of extemporiness as thought, memory, and preparation will allow. The speaker's animation and ardour should indicate his conviction; his eager and engaging address should testify to his own anxiety to succeed in reaching the minds of his auditory, while the dignity, importance, and undelayableness of his theme ought to be felt in the pressing energy and persistent importunity of his voice, gesture, and words.

Human infirmity, it may be pleaded, is too great to allow of the perfect acquirement and habitual employment of each and all of these characteristics and requirements. True; but the struggle to attain them gains them in precise proportion to its honest earnestness, and the pulpit orator alone has the promise—and that too from the Divine “Master of Assemblies,”—“Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.”

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